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DISCRIMINATION BASED ON HIV / AIDS AND OTHER HEALTH 
CONDmONS: "DISABILfIY" AS DEFINED UNDER FEDERAL 
AND STATE LAW* 
DAVID W. WEBBER, J.D.** 
LAWRENCE O. COSTIN, J.D., LL.D.*** 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years, the development of legal protections against dis-
crimination based on health conditions has been a public health and 
social justice legislative goal. . The inclusion of individuals with Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) within such non-discrimination pro-
tections has been an integral part of this process. The critical prob-
lem in developing an effective non-discrimination legal standard, 
however, has been in establishing the scope and contours of this stan-
dard-what health conditions are or are not to be included? The def-
inition of protected health conditions must be capable of reasonable 
comprehension for compliance purposes, while also being specific 
enough to allow effective interpretation and enforcement in the ad-
. ministrative agencies and the courts. 
Beginning with the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 
federal legislative efforts have been directed at the development of a 
statutory definition of disability that requires something more than a 
* Portions of this Article appeared in an earlier fonn in Disability Discrimination in 
America: HN/AIDS and Other Health Conditions, 281 JAMA 745-52 (1999), copyright 1999, 
American Medical Association. This Article is an outgrowth of the HIV Law & Policy Study: 
A Project of the Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law Center, supported 
by the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation. The authors are grateful to Timothy M. Westmoreland, 
LL.B., project director, to the national experts in law and public health that attended three 
project meetings on the implications of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bragdon v. Abbott, 
and toJames Hodge,Jr.,J.D., LL.M., for research direction and Deborah Reichmann,J.D., 
M.P.H., for research assistance on the state law summary. 
** J.D., Temple University. David W. Webber is the editor of AIDS AND THE LAw (3d 
ed. 1997). 
*** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor, Johns Hopkins 
School of Hygiene and Public Health; and Co-Director of the Georgetown/Johns Hopkins 
Program on Law and Public Health. 
l. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796i (1994». 
2. Although the original enactment of the Rehabilitation Act used the term "handi-
cap," this paper uses the preferred tenn "disability" throughout. The latter tenninology 
was approved in the Americans with Disabilities Act as well as other federal statutes provid-
ing protection against discrimination on the basis of health conditions. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102 (1994). 
266 
HeinOnline -- 3 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 267 1999-2000
2000] "DISABIU1:Y" UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAw 267 
health condition of a trivial or inconsequential nature. At the same 
time, however, the condition cannot be so serious or severe as to 
render the individual wholly unable to participate in the program, or 
to work in the workplace, in question.3 Also, because the conditions 
to be protected cannot reasonably be listed, given their variable na-
ture in individuals and the need to allow for identification of addi-
tional health conditions in the future, the disability definition is 
generic in nature, without listing, even for illustrative purposes, any 
specific health condition as a disability. Although nondiscrimination 
laws at the state and local levels include some notable deviations from 
this federal definition, the federal definition has been widely influen-
tial in the development of non-discrimination standards at the state 
level. 
HIV infection presents a fundamental question al)out the extent 
of protection afforded by this definition. Understanding in what 
sense this health condition is a disability-it presents no apparent lim-
itations on everyday activities-is invaluable in comprehending the 
meaning and purpose of federal disability nondiscrimination law 
more generally and assessing alternative approaches, such as those 
presented by some state laws. In this Article, we examine the disability 
definition "problem" from the standpoint of HIV infection, specifi-
cally HIV infection in its "asymptomatic" phase. By definition, this 
phase of the infection does not involve physical limitations or impair-
ments of the sort that are frequently viewed as resulting in disability. 
Although our discussion focuses on asymptomatic HIV infection, it 
should be noted that infection with HIV may result in differing assess-
ments of disability at different times for different individuals. Diagno-
sis with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), for example, 
has been taken to be the sine qua non of a disability under the federal 
definition, yet "AIDS" is nothing more than a diagnostic definition 
established by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) for epidemiological purposes.4 Although the diagnosis can be 
based on one or more physical symptoms, the diagnosis does not re-
3. For a critical assessment of the disability definition used in federal law, see Robert 
L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special 
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 415-34 
(1997). 
4. See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1993 Revised Classification 
System for HIV Infection and Expanded Suroeillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents 
and Adults, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REp. 1, 1-19 (RR-17, 1992). The definition 
has gone through four revisions since its original promulgation in 1982. For a fuller dis-
cussion of the AIDS definition, see AIDS AND THE LAw § 1.6, at 12-13 (David W. Webber 
ed., 3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999). 
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quire a specific degree of physical or mental limitation or impairment. 
Indeed, one can be diagnosed with AIDS based solely on laboratory 
evidence of suppressed immune system function combined with one 
or more clinical conditions. Subsequent to diagnosis, however, an in-
dividual's immune system function may return to normal levels and 
the clinical conditions may resolve. Therefore, because an individual 
diagnosed with AIDS may currently have no symptoms, such an indi-
vidual may face much the same problem in establishing a disability as 
would an individual who has never had symptoms of the infection. 
On the other hand, infection with HIV may in some individuals have a 
profound psychological impact, which may be disabling. Thus, as we 
explore in more detail below, determining whether someone is an in-
dividual with a disability under the federal definition has little depen-
dence on the medical nomenclature used to label the individual's 
health condition. 
We begin by summarizing the need for federal nondiscrimination 
standards offering protection for individuals with HIV. We then pro-
vide a brief discussion of the definition of disability under the result-
ing legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 5 
We summarize the early judicial and administrative views of the ADA 
as protecting individuals with HIV. We next tum to judicial interpre-
tation of the ADA in cases in which that understanding has been dis-
puted, including, most notably, the Supreme Court's attempt to 
answer the question in its seminal HIV case, Bragdon v. Abbott,6 as well 
as the Court's subsequent interpretations of the ADA definition. We 
then discuss the results of a fifty-state survey of HIV-specific statutes, as 
well as more general state disability statutes. In our survey, we provide 
a descriptive and analytical discussion of these laws, offering our views 
as to whether they provide protection independent of federal provi-
sions. An appendix to this paper provides a table summarizing signifi-
cant features of these laws, and a separate compilation provides a 
state-by-state summary of their disability definition as it relates to HIV 
infection. 
I. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
From the earliest moments of the Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV / AIDS) epidemic 
there emerged an alliance among public health and community-based 
5. Pub. L. No. lOl-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102, 12111-12117, 12131-12134, 12141-12150, 12161-12165, 12181-
12189, 12201-12213 (1994». 
6. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
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organizations emphasizing the importance of effective legislation 
prohibiting discrimination. Every major govemment,7 medical,S pulr 
lie health,9 legal,1O and civil libertiesll organization to issue a report 
on the epidemic condemned discrimination. The Presidential Com-
mission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic in 1988 
was particularly insistent about the transcending importance of fed-
eral legislation to safeguard against invidious discrimination: 
As long as discrimination occurs, and no strong national pol-
icy with rapid and effective remedies against discrimination 
is established, individuals who are infected with HIV will be 
reluctant to come forward for testing, counseling, and care. 
This fear of potential discrimination ... will undermine our 
efforts to contain the HIV epidemic and will leave HIV-in-
fected individuals isolated and alone.12 
Although the emphasis on a federal legislative remedy for HIV-based 
discrimination in the ADA was no doubt a result of the view that state 
nondiscrimination standards were, at least in some jurisdictions, inad-
equate,13 the need for nondiscrimination standards was felt in some 
localities to be sufficiently urgent that some states and municipalities 
adopted HIV-specific protections before action was taken on the fed-
eral level. Los Angeles, as the west coast epicenter of the epidemic, 
for example, was in 1985 the first municipality to adopt an HIV-spe-
cific nondiscrimination law.14 In contrast, non-discrimination pro tec-
7. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Services Guidelines for Counseling 
and Antibody Testing to Prevent HlV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDrIY & MORTALITY WEEKLY 
REp. 509, 514 (1987). 
8. See, e.g., American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Prevention and Control of 
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim Report, 258JAMA 2097,2101-02 (1987); INsrI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENCES, CoNFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR 
PUBllC HEALTH CARE AND REsEARCH 19 (1986). 
9. See, e.g., AssOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, GUIDE TO PUB-
llC HEALTH PRACTICE: AIDS CoNFIDENTIALrIY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES 11 
(1988). 
10. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, POllCY ON AIDS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 4 (1989); AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, AIDS CoORDINATING CoMMITTEE, AIDS: THE 
LEGAL ISSUES 2 (1988). 
11. See, e.g., ACLV AIDS PROJECT, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF AIDS DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE 1980s AND Poucy RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s 1-3 (1990). 
12. REpORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CoMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS 
EPIDEMIC 119 (1988). 
13. See H.R REp. No. 485, pt. 2, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.CAN. 
(104 Stat. 303) 329 (noting "[t]oo many States, for whatever reason, still perpetuate confu-
sion" regarding nondiscrimination standards). 
14. See Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE § 45.80 (1985), available at <http://Ci-
tyfolio.ci.la.ca.usl cgi-bi. . .9680}&softpage=Document42&x=19&y=12> (visited Feb. 28, 
2000). . 
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tion based on HIV status was first introduced in Congress in 1987 but 
not adopted until enactment of the ADA in 1990.15 
Recommendations for anti-discrimination legislation relied on 
three justifications-discrimination violates basic tenets of individual 
justice, damages the economic and social fabric of America, and weak-
ens the nation's abilities to prevent and treat HIV / AIDS. 
Discrimination based on an infectious condition is just as inequi-
table as discrimination based on race, gender, or other health condi-
tion. In each case, people are treated inequitably, not because they 
lack inherent ability, but solely because of a status over which they 
have no control. Complex and often pernicious mythologies develop 
about the nature, cause, and transmission of disease. As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, "society's accumulated myths and fears about 
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limita-
tions that flow from actual impairment. Few aspects of a handicap 
give rise to the same level of public fear and misapprehension as con-
tagiousness."16 Persons living with HIV / AIDS have to endure not only 
archaic attitudes that they present a health threat, but also moral dis-
approval of their behavior. The fact that HIV / AIDS is associated in 
the public consciousness with traditionally disfavored groups-gay 
men, injection drug users, and commercial sex workers-only height-
ens the concern about prejudicial treatment. 
Discrimination against persons living with HIV / AIDS is economi-
cally and socially detrimental. By rendering talented individuals un-
employable or uninsurable or by impairing their ability to secure 
housing or receive health care or other services, discrimination tears 
at the social and economic fabric of the nation. 
Finally, discrimination undermines public health efforts to iden-
tify infections, prevent transmission, and provide care and treatment 
for persons living with the HIV disease. The public health strategy is 
to encourage the population to be tested, to educate the population 
to avoid risk behaviors such as unprotected sex and the sharing of 
drug injection equipment, and to provide opportunities for humane 
care and effective treatment for all persons infected with HIV.17 From 
the beginning, it has been clear that if individuals fear the personal, 
15. For a more detailed history of congressional consideration of HIV nondiscrimina-
tion standards, see AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 3.6 (3d ed. 1997). 
16. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
17. See generaUy, COMMISSION ON AIDS RESEARCH & THE BEHAVIORAL, Soc. & STATISTICAL 
SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOCIAL IMPA= OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 23-43 
(Albert R. Jonsen & Jeff Stryker eds., 1993) [hereinafter SOCIAL IMPA= OF AIDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES]. 
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social, and economic consequences of being diagnosed with HIV / 
AIDS, they may forego testing, fail to discuss their health and risk be-
haviors with counselors or health care professionals, and refrain from 
entering the health care system for treatment. Consequently, the 
need for law reform to protect against discrimination emerged as one 
of the most important public health strategies in the early years of the 
epidemic. 
The social, economic, and public health effects of the HIV / AIDS 
epidemic in the 1980s 18 set in motion a series of events that would 
lead to enactment of the most significant civil rights legislation since 
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19 A coalition of organi-
zations and people committed to the rights of persons with HIV / AIDS 
and persons with other disabilities formed to seek federal legislation 
designed to proscribe discrimination.20 
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
The Americans with Disabilities Act became the federal anti-dis-
crimination law that had been so widely and earnestly sought. The 
National Commission on the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 
in 1991, applauded the passage of the ADA: "The landmark Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a significant step toward protecting 
the rights of all disabled Americans, including people with HIV dis-
ease. The passage of the ADA with the inclusion of protections for 
people with HIV disease is a victory worth celebrating."21 
The heart of the ADA is the prohibition, in varying contexts, of 
discrimination against individuals with a real or perceived disability. 
Yet the ADA does not identify any specific health conditions as disabil-
ities; there is no statutory listing, whether exclusive or inclusive, of 
disabilities. Instead, in an effort to ensure broad and flexible cover-
age, the ADA includes a general definition of what constitutes a disa-
bility. This statutory approach is the result of both practical and 
political considerations. As a practical matter, an adequately inclusive· 
listing of health conditions that results in a finding of disability may 
well be impossible to formulate. The formulation of such a listing, 
18. See ill. 
19. See Chai R. Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquires Under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 521, 521-22 (1991). 
20. See Chai R. Feldblum, The (R)evolution of Physical Disability Anti-discrimination Law: 
1976-1996, MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABIUTIES L. REp. 613, 617 (1996); Feldblum, supra note 
19, at 523-31. See also SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 17. 
21. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, AMERICA LIV-
ING WITH AIDS 113 (1991). 
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dependent as it would be on specialized medical and scientific knowl-
edge, is certainly not an undertaking appropriate for the legislative 
process.22 As a political matter, adoption of a generic definition 
avoided the problem of considering, comparing, and deciding 
whether or not to include competing health conditions. At the same 
time, advocates for legal protection for individuals with disabilities 
were able to form a successful political coalition that asserted far more 
influence on the legislative process than would have been possible 
had advocates for each specific health condition been acting alone. 
The ADA thus eschews the approach of previous legislative proposals 
that would have singled out one health condition or another, such as 
HIV infection23 or cancer,24 for protection. So while the generic defi-
nition was a legislative success as a result of coalition politics, all indi-
viduals with disabilities, including individuals with HIV, are faced with 
the necessary task, then, of establishing that their health condition 
meets the generic statutory criteria. 
According to the ADA, a disability is a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
an individual, or a record of such impairment, or being regarded as 
having such an impairment.25 This definition applies throughout the 
ADA. Thus, cases concerning the meaning of disability that arise 
under Title I (employment) are equally applicable to Titles II (public 
services) and III (public accommodations). The ADA provides, first, a 
definition of actual disability: an impairment, physical or mental, that 
imposes a substantial limitation on a major life activity.26 Second, an 
individual who has a record of such an impairment is protected, even 
though the record refers to an impairment in the past which is not 
22. Congress might have delegated the responsibility of fonnulating such a listing, con-
sistent with the generic definition enacted by statute, to the administrative agencies re-
sponsible for enforcement of the statute. To a degree, those agencies have sought to 
provide a more detailed definition in their regulations and interpretative guidance. While 
the Supreme Court deferred to the Department of Justice's view that HIV is a disability 
under the ADA in Bragdon v. Abbott, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 
(1999), the Court held that Congress had not delegated any authority to the enforcement 
agencies to interpret the statutory definition. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. 
23. See AIDS Federal Policy Act of 1987, S.1575/H.R 3071, 100th Cong. (1987) (pro-
posing nondiscrimination for individuals with HIV); 133 Congo Rec. 21,903 (1987) (text of 
Senate bill as introduced). 
24. See, e.g., Barbara Hoffman, Empluyment Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The 
Need for Federal Legislation, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1986) (advocating enactment of the Cancer 
Patients Employment Rights Act, H.R 1294, 99th Congo (1985». 
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
26. See id. 
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currently a disability.27 Third, under the "regarded as" prong of the 
definition, it is unlawful to discriminate against an individual based on 
the (mis)perception that the person has a disability.28 Persons dis-
criminated against because of their association with a person with a 
disability infection are also protected,29 as are persons retaliated 
against because of their opposition to discrimination.3o In addition to 
the ADA, the same definition of disability is included in two other 
federal nondiscrimination laws, which are more limited in scope than 
the ADA but nevertheless provide significant protection against disa-
bility-based discrimination: the Rehabilitation Act of 197331 and the 
Fair Housing Act. 32 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the ADA does not explic-
itly mention HIV. Yet after the ADA's enactment, there existed a 
sense of complete assurance that strong federal protection was now in 
force to protect persons at all stages of the disease, ranging from pure 
asymptomatic HIV infection through to CDGdefined AIDS. This 
sense of assurance was informed by an understanding of the social 
and legislative history that gave rise to the ADA, guidance provided by 
the executive branch, and the interpretation of the statutory defini-
tion by the judiciary. 
Given the social and political forces that led to the ADA, it is not 
surprising that there existed a widely held view that the law covered 
persons living with HIV / AIDS. The HIV / AIDS community, as we 
have suggested, played a powerful role in enactment of the legislation, 
and these groups gave no sign of discontent with the coverage pro-
vided in the statute. Indeed, among legal commentators on the sub-
ject, dissent on this point was virtually nonexistent. 33 
27. This protection is similar to the laws in some states that protect against discrimina-
tion based on an individual having a record of HIV testing, as discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 156-161 and 180-182. 
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (1994). 
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 112(b)(4) (1994) and § 12182(b) (1) (E) (1994); Finley v. Giacobbe, 
827 F. Supp. 215,219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203; Shererv. Foodmaker, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1994). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994). 
33. See Gary lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a Causal Interpretation of Section 
504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 237 (1989) (arguing against HIV as a disability under § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act); cf William G. Buss, Educating Children with Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus. in AIDS AND THE LAw § 4.10, at 125 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that conclusion that 
asymptomatic HIV infected individuals are covered under section 504 and the ADA is per-
suasive but not inevitable); William G. Buss, Human Immunodeficiency ViTlLl', the Legal Mean-
ing of "Handicap, " and Implications for Public Education Under Federal Law at the Dawn of the Agl1 
of the ADA, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1389 (1992) (same). 
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Throughout the consideration of the ADA during the lOIst Con-
gress, protection from discrimination for persons with HIV infection 
was a stated objective.34 President Bush, in urging passage of the 
ADA, did so on the basis that it would protect individuals with AIDS 
and HIV infection from discrimination.35 The Senate version of the 
ADA, S. 933, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources, which considered the issue of HIV infection as a disabil-
ity.36 The House version, H.R. 2273, was introduced in four commit-
tees, two of which considered the issue of HIV infection as a disability 
under the ADA: the Committee on Labor and Education37 and the 
Committee on the Judiciary.38 All legislative reports that addressed 
the issue concluded that HIV infection is an impairment under the 
ADA and apparently assumed that the impairment caused by HIV sulr 
stantially limits one or more major life activity. Furthermore, most of 
the congressional consideration of HIV focused on the issue of 
whether HIV, as an infectious disease, should be treated differently 
from other disabilities under the ADA. Attempts by critics of the pro-
posed ADA to exclude persons with infectious or communicable dis-
eases from coverage were unsuccessful, which again emphasizes 
congressional intent in extending protection.39 If HIV infection was 
not viewed by Congress as a health condition included under the pro-
posed definition of disability, there would have been no reason to at-
tempt to include such a communicable disease exception. Similarly, it 
34. This discussion of the legislative history of HIV in regard to the ADA is derived 
from AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 3.6 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999). 
35. See Bush Endorses Protections for HN-Positive Contained in Americans with Disabilities Act, 
DAILY LAB. REp., Mar. 30, 1990, at A4 (urging passage of ADA "that prohibits discrimination 
against those with HIV and AIDS"). 
36. See Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1989, S. REp. No. 106-116, at 8 (1989). See also statements upon Senate approval, 135 
CONGo REe. S10,789 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 135 CONGo REe. S1O,794 (statement of 
Sen. Moynihan); 135 CONGo REe. S1O,800 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. 
Simon). 
37. See H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
333 [hereinafter House Labor Report]. 
38. See H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 
445,451 n.18 [hereinafter House Judiciary Report] (citing approvingly 1988 Department 
of Justice memorandum for conclusion that individuals with HIV infection have an impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity and thus are disabled). 
39. See 136 CONGo REe. H4613 (daily ed.July 12,1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer 
in opposition to coverage of persons with communicable diseases); House Judiciary Commit-
tee Begins Markup of Bill to Prohibit Bias Against Disabled, DAILY LAB. REp., May 2, 1990, at A9 
(House Judiciary Committee rejection of amendment offered by Rep. Dannemeyer to ex-
clude homosexuals infected with HIV from coverage under the ADA). Debate on H.R. 
2273 was limited in the House under H. Res. 394, 101st CONGo (1990), and thus the gen-
eral question of whether individuals with infectious diseases should be covered by nondis-
crimination standards was not be debated. 
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is notable that the debate in Congress on the question of whether 
food service workers with communicable diseases in general, and HIV 
in particular, should be protected from employment discrimination 
resulted in floor votes on that question in both the House and the 
Senate.40 Again, such votes would not have been necessary if Con-
gress did not believe it was enacting a law that protected individuals 
with HIV. Perhaps even more significantly, the ADA's disability defini-
tion is adopted from the Rehabilitation Act, which at the time of con-
gressional consideration of the ADA was widely viewed as including 
individuals with HIV infection within its protection. Congress indi-
cated that the ADA is to be read in light of existing standards under 
the Rehabilitation Act.41 Indeed, both the House42 and Senate43 re-
ports on the ADA approved the Department of ]ustice's Office of 
Legal Counsel memorandum, which concluded that a person infected 
with HIV is covered under the first prong of the definition of the term 
disability because of a substantial limitation to "procreation and inti-
mate personal relationships."44 In essence, Congress appears to have 
considered HIV as a per se disability in enacting the ADA. This view 
of the legislative history has been acknowledged by the courts that 
have considered the question.45 
A. Executive Branch Interpretation of the ADA 
The administrative agencies charged with enforcing the ADA, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the De-
partment of ]ustice (DO]), both concluded that the statute covered all 
stages of HIV infection. The EEOC's interpretive guidance, recogniz-
ing the unique social history of the disease, sets HIV apart from other 
disabling conditions. "Some impairments," the EEOC states, "may be 
disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depending on 
40. For a fuller discussion of the "food handling" controversy during congressional 
consideration of the ADA, see AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 3.6, at 112-17. 
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994). See also House Labor Report at 52, reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. 
42. See House Labor Report at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.G.A.N. 303, 334 (citing ap-
provinglya 1988 U.S. Department of Justice opinion that HIV infection is a disability under 
the Rehabilitation Act because of substantial limitation on procreation and intimate sexual 
relationships); House Judiciary Report at 28-29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451. 
43. See S. REp. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990). 
44. Memorandum of Douglas Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President 
(Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REp., Oct. 7, 1988, at DI. 
45. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1078 (W.D. Wis. 
1998) ("the legislative history behind the ADA indicates that lawmakers understood that 
the act would cover anyone infected with HIV"). 
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the stage of the disease or disorder .... Other impairments, however, 
such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting."46 The 
Department of Justice explicitly includes "HIV disease (symptomatic 
or asymptomatic)" in its regulations and interpretive guidance as a 
disability. The DOJ notes: "The phrase 'symptomatic or asymptom-
atic' was inserted in the final rule after 'HIV disease' in response to 
commentors who suggested the clarification was necessary."47 
B. Lower Courts' Interpretation of the Disability Definition 
Early judicial opinions similarly presumed, virtually without ex-
planation, that the federal disability definition covered persons with 
asymptomatic HIV infection.48 Certainly, this appeared to be the case 
with respect to the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the precursor to 
the ADA. Parmet and Jackson note: 
As an initial matter, every reported decision from the mid-
1980s up until the passage of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act in 1990 determined that both AIDS and, when 
presented, asymptomatic HIV infection constituted disabili-
ties. . .. In fact, it took only a few years for an overwhelming 
judicial consensus to develop that HIV-and AIDS-infected 
individuals were properly protected by existing disability dis-
crimination statutes.49 
The broad consensus established in Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence 
continued after the ADA's enactment. The early cases continued to 
see the question of whether asymptomatic HIV infection was a cov-
ered disability as a settled matter. 50 
The unquestioned consensus on coverage of persons with asymp-
tomatic HIV infection began to crumble in the mid-1990s,just as the 
first advancements in the treatment of HIV disease were becoming 
reality. Emphasizing the ADA's requirement for an "individualized 
determination,"51 a concept thoughtfully endorsed by the Supreme 
46. 29 C.F.R pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1999). 
47. U.S. Department of Justice, ADA Title II Interpretive Guidance, 28 GF.R § 35.104 
(1999). 
48. See, e.g., Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1532-33 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (noting 
HIV infection but absence of symptoms of AIDS in Rehabilitation Act case.). 
49. Wendy E. Pannet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabkd: The Legal Impact of the New 
Social Construction of HN, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16-17 (1997). 
50. See, e.g., Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Mich. 
1994); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 
110,111 (D. Utah 1993). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) 
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Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,52 courts began to criti-
cally question the premise that asymptomatic HIV infection automati-
cally qualifies as a disability. In particular, the Fourth Circuit ruled 
that not only is HIV infection not a disability under the ADA53-the 
infection is not even an impairment. 54 In another case in which there 
was no dispute that the plaintiff's son was infected with HIV, the 
Fourth Circuit noted that "[t]here is no evidence in the record before 
us that [the plaintiff's son] is impaired, to any degree, or that he cur-
rently endures any limitation, yet alone a substantial limitation, on any 
major life activity."55 In yet another case, a federal district court ruled 
that HIV infection is not a disability for a plaintiff on the basis that his 
infection imposed no substantial limitation on a major life activity. 56 
Cases of this sort raised the question of when and under what circum-
stances an individual with HIV can invoke the protections of the ADA. 
C. The Supreme Court's ADA Disability Definition Decisions 
Beginning in its 1997-98 term, the Supreme Court issued the first 
of a series of decisions defining the protections afforded by the 
ADA.57 In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court held that a woman with asymp-
tomatic HIV infection is an individual with a disability. 58 In that case, 
a dentist, Dr. Bragdon, refused to fill a dental cavity of an HIV-in-
fected patient, Sidney Abbott, in his office on the basis of her HIV 
infection.59 Ms. Abbott then brought suit alleging that the refusal vio-
lated the Title III public accommodation provisions of the ADA.60 Dr. 
Bragdon conceded that his professional office was covered by the 
ADA, but argued that the plaintiff, who did not have symptoms of HIV 
illness, was not an individual with a disability under the ADA.61 Addi-
tionally, he argued that providing services to the infected patient, be-
52. 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987). 
53. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 174 (4th Cir. 1997). 
54. See id. at 168. The Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott implicitly over-
ruled Runnebaum. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text. 
55. Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55,60 (4th Cir. 1995). 
56. See Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 539,546-47 (E.D.N.C. 1996). 
57. In addition to the four cases directly involving the definition of disability under the 
ADA discussed infra notes 58-93 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has to date 
issued two other rulings construing that statute. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections 
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (holding that the ADA is applicable to state prisons); Olm-
stead v. L.C., 524 U.S. 581 (1999) (holding that the ADA requires residential placement in 
least restrictive environment). 
58. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). 
59. See id. at 629. 
60. See id. 
6l. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934,939 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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cause of the risk of HIV transmission, would pose a direct threat to his 
health.62 Bragdon, however, did not present the question of whether 
Ms. Abbott was regarded by Dr. Bragdon as having a disability under 
the third prong of the ADA disability definition. 
The Court's ruling that Ms. Abbott was an individual with a disa-
bility had three bases. First, her HIV infection imposed a substantial 
limitation on one of her major life activities-reproduction.63 Sec-
ond, the Court relied on the ADA's own construction clause, which 
requires that it be interpreted to provide no less protection than "the 
standards applied under the Title V of the Rehabilitation Act ... or 
the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant" to that Act.64 
Third, the Court ruled that judicial deference, under the doctrine of 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,65 is due to 
the Department of Justice's views that individuals with asymptomatic 
HIV infection are covered by the ADA.66 
While the Court's ruling that Ms. Abbott's HIV infection was an 
impairment that imposed a substantial limitation on one of her major 
life activities was adequate to dispose of the appeal, the Court never-
theless adduced the two additional arguments in favor of the conclu-
sion that HIV is a disability. Thus, while stating that it was not 
reaching the issue of whether HIV is a per se disability under the 
ADA, the Court in effect held that it was. Furthermore, it should be 
noted, the Court did not state that HIV is not a per se disability, simply 
that it need not reach that issue, despite its grant of certiorari on that 
question.67 As a result, Bragdon contains an internal tension. Plain-
tiffs with HIV must be prepared to plead and prove a disability. At the 
same time federal agency interpretations, to which the courts owe def-
erence, dictate that HIV is "inherently disabling," and the ADA by its 
own language, by incorporating Rehabilitation Act standards, requires 
62. Discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling on the direct threat issue, see 524 U.S. at 
648-55, is beyond the scope of this Article. On remand, however, the First Circuit Court 
ruled that Dr. Bragdon's evidence of direct threat WdS "too speculative or too tangential 
(or, in some instances, both) to create a genuine issue of material fact" and affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiff Sidney Abbott. 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997». 
63. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 
64. Id. at 631-32 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994». 
65. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Where Congress has not explicitly asked an administrative 
agency to clarify a statutory provision by regulation, the necessity of agency guidance may 
be implicit. See id. at 844. "In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency." Id. This provides agency guidance roughly the same weight as administrative 
regulations, which are reviewed using an arbitrary and capricious standard. See id. 
66. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646. 
67. See id. at 641-42. 
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nothing less than the conclusion that HIV is a disability. The view that 
HIV infection is a per se disability also obviates the logical inconsis-
tency that results from determining disability based on actual limita-
tions imposed by the infection. Why should some individuals, such as 
Ms. Abbott, be able to prevail on their claim that they have an ADA 
disability because of limitations on reproduction, while others, such as 
a child with HIV who is denied access to dental care, cannot invoke 
the ADA's protection when the underlying health condition is the 
same for both? As we suggest below, there may be other major life 
activities than reproduction and sexual relations that are substantially 
limited by HIV infection. But whether one or another major life activ-
ity is limited by HIV is not a function of HIV as a health condition 
itself, it is often a function of the individual's age, personal choices, 
and other factors independent of HIV. 
This view of Bragdon-that it establishes, sotto voce, HIV infection 
itself as a disability-is consistent with the views expressed by the 
lower federal courts in the year after Bragdon. On remand from the 
Supreme Court, for example, the First Circuit noted that "earlier 
phases of this litigation established that asymptomatic HIV constitutes 
a disability under the ADA.,,68 The Eighth Circuit similarly cited Brag-
don for the proposition that HIV is a disability under the ADA. 69 The 
Second Circuit cited Bragdon for the view that HIV is a disability under 
the analogous provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. 70 Only the Fifth 
Circuit, however, took a narrower, more literal, view of Bragdon, inter-
preting it as holding that HIV inherently limits certain major life activ-
ities, but not ruling on HIV as a per se disability. 71 
One year after its ruling in Bragdon, the Supreme Court issued a 
trio of decisions construing the ADA's application to the workplace. 
First, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,72 the Court answered a question 
not reached in Bragdon by holding that corrective or remedial meas-
ures are to be taken into account in determining whether an individ-
ual has a disability as defined by the ADA. 73 In Bragdon, the Court 
concluded that even with mitigating measures, Ms. Abbott neverthe-
less had a disability, and thus the issue need not be reached.74 But in 
Sutton, the Court rejected the interpretation of the EEOC and DOl, 
68. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 88 (1st Cir. 1998). 
69. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825, 831 n.5 (8th Cir. 1998). 
70. See Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998). 
71. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 478 n.15 (5th Cir. 1998). 
72. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). 
73. See id. at 2145. 
74. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1998). 
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which both had concluded that the individual's impairment should be 
assessed without regard to any corrective or remedial measures, as un-
supported by the plain text of the ADA itself.75 Then, in Murphy v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 76 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,77 the 
Court applied Sutton to similarly conclude that, taking into account 
mitigating measures, the plaintiffs did not have disabilities as defined 
by the ADA. 78 
As noted above, Bragdon took the mitigating effects of medication 
into account in determining whether Ms. Abbott's impairment im-
posed a substantial limitation on her major life activity of reproduc-
tion.79 The Court identified two independent ways in which HIV 
imposed that limitation: first, the risk of HIV transmission to the indi-
vidual's sexual partner (the Court cited studies indicating a risk from 
twenty to twenty-five percent for male partners of HIV-infected wo-
men) ,80 and, second, the risk of HIV transmission to the child during 
pregnancy and childbirth (the Court referred to an eight percent risk 
of transmission) .81 Thus, even taking into account the effects of medi-
cation in mitigating the limitation imposed by Ms. Abbott's HIV infec-
tion, she was nevertheless found to have a substantial limitation.82 
The Court's view of administrative agency interpretations of the 
ADA as expressed in Sutton is also pertinent. First, the Court found 
that the EEOC's regulation that mitigating measures should not be 
taken into account was without support in the statutory language and 
thus invalid.83 Perhaps more significantly, however, the Court noted 
that "no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term 
'disability' "84 as it appears in the ADA's definition section.85 Never-
theless, the Court noted that" [b] ecause both parties accept these reg-
ulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to 
decide this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference they 
are due, if any."86 The significance of the conclusion that no agency is 
authorized by Congress to interpret the term "disability" in the ADA is 
unclear. It might suggest that the Bragdon Court's deference to the 
75. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. 
76. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). 
77. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). 
78. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169. 
79. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640-41. 
80. See id. at 639-40. 
81. See id. at 640. 
82. See id. at 640-41. 
83. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. 
84. [d. 
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
86. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. 
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Department of Justice interpretation of the term was misplaced as a 
technical matter; because the Department of Justice did not have the 
authority to promulgate that regulation, it was not entitled to defer-
ence under Chevron. That does not mean, however, that the agencies' 
interpretation of the disability definition as to HIV is not entitled to 
deference. The agencies' interpretation has persuasive authority 
based on their specialized expertise and experience.87 Accordingly, 
the Court's view of the regulations in Sutton does not reverse its reli-
ance on them in Bragdon. 
The Court's determination in Sutton of whether an employee or 
applicant for employment is "regarded as" disabled under the third 
prong of the disability definition is more troublesome. The Court 
noted two scenarios that might arise under that sub-definition of disa-
bility: in the employment context, the employer must either believe 
that the individual has an impairment imposing a substantial limita-
tion when in fact the individual does not have an impairment, or the 
covered entity must believe that the individual has a substantially limit-
ing impairment when in fact the impairment is not substantially limit-
ing.88 The Court adopted the EEOC's "more than one job" rule, 
explaining that 
[w] hen the major life activity under consideration is that of 
working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, 
at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work 
in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the 
EEOC uses a specialized definition of the term "substantially 
limits" when referring to the major life activity of working: 
'significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class 
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particu-
lar job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the ma-
jor life activity of working. '89 
In noting these two scenarios, the Court did not reference a third 
theory set forth in the EEOC regulations. Under that theory, the indi-
vidual may have an "impairment that substantially limits major life ac-
tivities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such 
impairment."9o The EEOC's Interpretative Guidance goes further in 
87. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 
§ 6.3, at 242-44 (3d ed. 1994). 
88. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50. 
89. [d. at 2151 (quoting 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999». 
90. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(k)(2) (1999). 
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stating that the employer's perception of the condition need not be 
shared by others in the field. 91 Furthermore, according to the EEOC, 
if the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the 
employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the 
basis of "myth, fear, or stereotype" can be drawn.92 Concerns regard-
ing productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of accom-
modation and accessibility, workers' compensation costs, and 
acceptance by coworkers and customers are included among those 
that frequently result from attitudinal barriers. 
Although the Bragdon ruling is of historic import as the Court's 
first and only ruling in response to the HIV / AIDS epidemic, the 
Court's opinion is noteworthy as a painstaking exercise in statutory 
construction, interpreting the statutory text with reference only to 
agency interpretations that "confirm" or "further reinforce" the 
Court's own interpretation of the statutory language, and referring in 
passing to the statute's congressional history only insofar as that his-
tory, in tum, was the basis for agency interpretation. While the coali-
tion responsible for the passage of the ADA assumed that it would be 
interpreted with regard to its legislative history and the purpose un-
derlying its enactment, including the need for nondiscrimination 
standards for individuals with HIV, that assumption collided with the 
Supreme Court's approach to statutory construction-an approach 
that concerns itself only with the statute's text, not with the context of 
its enactment. Thus, many of the "good intentions" behind the ADA, 
including its attention to HIV as a disability, have been lost as a result 
of what William Eskridge Jr. has called the Supreme Court's "con-
servative process statism."93 
D. The Future of Disability Discrimination 
In Bragdon, the Court identified only "reproduction" as the major 
life activity that Ms. Abbott's HIV infection limited;94 she had testified 
that she had decided not to have children because of her HIV statuS.95 
The Court noted, however, that by basing its ruling on reproduction, 
it was simply ruling on the issue as raised and considered in the lower 
courts and as stated in the first question on which the Court granted 
certiorari.96 Furthermore, the Court indicated that the regulatory list-
91. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(l) (1999). 
92. Id. 
93. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 298-300 (1994). 
94. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). 
95. See id. at 639. 
96. See id. at 638. 
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ing of major life activities should be treated as illustrative, not exhaus-
tive,97 thus opening consideration of major life activities to more than 
the nine specific functions listed in the EEOC and Department of Jus-
tice regulations.98 Reproduction itself is not included in the listing. 
The Court explained that "had different parties brought the suit they 
would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantiallimi-
tations on other major life activities"99 and furthermore implied that 
there are "major life activities of many sorts."lOO 
If reproduction is a major life activity, it should follow that non-
reproductive sexual relations should also be treated as major life activ-
ity. It follows from the Court's holding, which relied on the 1988 Of-
fice of Legal Counsel (OLC) Opinion interpreting the Rehabilitation 
Act, to conclude that "intimate sexual activities," not just reproduc-
tion, should be viewed as a major life activity.lol Both were identified 
in the OLC Opinion as among the major life activities potentially lim-
ited by HIV, and it seems unlikely that any court would reach a con-
trary conclusion as to sexual relations without procreation as an 
objective.102 As a result, there should be no dispute in the future that 
individuals who experience a substantial limitation on reproduction 
and/ or sexual function (the vast majority of those claiming coverage 
under Tide I of the ADA) can invoke the ADA. Nevertheless, individ-
uals, such as children, whose HIV infection does not impose a substan-
tial limitation on their reproductive or sexual function, would not be 
covered by this interpretation of the ADA and would need to prove 
that other major life activities are substantially limited. 
Finally, and perhaps most importandy, individuals with HIV can 
assert that their HIV status imposes a substantial limitation on their 
social functioning or ability to participate in society, both as a result of 
their infection and as a result of others' perception of HIV infection. 
Although "participating in community activities" is not listed in the 
regulatory definition of major life activity, this category of major life 
activity was referenced in the ADA's legislative history.103 This view is 
97. See id. at 638-39. 
98. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (ii) (1999) and 28 C.F.R § 41.31 (b)(2) (1999) (stating 
that major life activities include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working"). 
99. BragMn, 524 U.S. at 637. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. at 643. 
102. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that major life activity includes sexual relations in which disability in question is psychologi-
cal disorder); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992) (including 
procreation, sexual contact, and normal social relationships as major life activities). 
103. See House Judiciary Report at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334. 
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also expressed by Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Bragdon: 
"HIV infection ... has been regarded as a disease limiting life itself. 
The disease inevitably pervades life's choices: education, employment, 
family and financial undertakings. It affects the need for and, as this 
case shows, the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction of 
others to the impairment."104 The concurrence also cites family rela-
tions, employment potential, and ability to care for herself as major 
life activities.105 In short, there is some difference between the view of 
life activities as discrete physical or mental functions, such as walking 
or learning, and more abstract views of life activities as including a 
broad range of activities necessary for full social or community 
participation. 
Having established that the impairment of HIV infection imposes 
some limitation on one or more major life activities, the question re-
mains whether that limitation is substantial. The major life activities 
typically thought to be limited by HIV infection (reproduction, sexual 
relations) are the result of the infectious status of the individual with 
HIV. The Bragdon Court had no difficulty concluding that the risk of 
HIV transmission from mother to child (eight percent) or between 
sexual partners (twenty percent) was sufficient to meet the substantial-
ity test. While advances in treatment in the future might result in 
elimination of symptoms of disease, these treatments do not appar-
ently eliminate the infectious nature of HIV. As a result, despite ad-
vances in treatment, HIV may continue to be a disability because of 
the risk of transmission. Looking to other, more general life activities, 
such as social interaction, assessing the degree of limitation may be 
more difficult. To a large degree, this limitation is the result of atti-
tudes of individuals towards the illness. These attitudes may vary 
widely from individual to individual or in differing geographic areas. 
As a result, absent access to expert witnesses who can assess the com-
munity response to HIV infection, it is difficult to determine to what 
extent the substantial limitation can be posited on this basis. While 
some individuals with HIV will be able to provide anecdotal evidence 
of a response from others indicative of such an attitude, extending 
that to others may be problematic. 
Once the individual establishes that the discrimination was pre-
mised on myth or stereotype, additional proof that others share that 
attitude should not be necessary. While the Court explained in Brag-
don that the ADA "addresses substantial limitations ... not utter inabil-
104. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 656 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
105. See id. at 660 (Ginsburg, j., concurring). 
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ities,"106 application of the statutory definition does require that the 
limitation be substantial. Perhaps because harm resulting from trans-
mission is so significant, any chance of transmission will be deemed to 
be a substantial risk. Furthermore, while noting that "in the end, the 
disability definition does not tum on personal choice,"lo7 Bragdon 
does emphasize Ms. Abbott's decision not to have children as support-
ing the conclusion that her HIV infection was a limitation on her ma-
jor life activity of reproduction. 108 Thus, it would follow, if Ms. Abbott 
had not asserted that HIV was the reason for her declining to bear 
children, she would not have been able to invoke the protection of 
the ADA. If this is indeed the intention of the Court, it makes little 
sense. It would mean that an individual with HIV who does not 
choose to engage in the activity cannot claim it as a major life activity. 
This is the problem presented by children with HIV: they cannot in-
voke protection of the law on the basis of reproduction or sexual rela-
tions, which leaves social participation as the only life activity. For very 
young children, however, social participation itself may be limited. 
Notably, Bradgon did not involve the "regarded as" definition. Ms. Air 
bott certainly could have argued that Dr. Bragdon "regarded" her as 
having a disability by treating her as an individual with a condition 
that poses a direct threat to any dental professional, or, for that mat-
ter, any health care professional. 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, determining 
whether an individual has a disability under the ADA is a complex 
question. Whether individuals with asymptomatic HIV infection will 
be ruled to be individuals with disabilities in future cases remains un-
clear, depending on the facts of the case. It is very likely that most, if 
not all, such individuals would be covered. In any event, the litigation 
of HIV as a disability may pose significant barriers to plaintiffs who 
must plead and prove that their infection imposes a substantiallimita-
tion on a major life activity. In many cases, this may involve public 
disclosure of highly private facts. Putting into contention whether the 
HIV status has restricted the individual's sexual activities, for example, 
might open that issue for defendants to attempt to refute such a claim 
with evidence that the individual has in fact engaged in unsafe sexual 
relations. 
106. Id. at 641. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF STATE LAw ISSUES 
The ADA itself envisages that states and localities have provided, 
and will provide, anti-discrimination protection to persons with disa-
bilities. Congress expressed its will not to interfere with these state 
statutes and local ordinances, provided they afford as much, or 
greater, protection against discrimination: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit 
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or 
law of any State or political subdivision of any State or juris-
diction that provides greater or equal protection for the 
rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this 
Act. 109 
Despite the enactment of the ADA in 1990, and its apparent broad 
protection of individuals with HIV / AIDS, development of protective 
legal standards at the state level continued. For example, Florida and 
New Jersey, both states with significant HIV populations, adopted 
HIV-specific nondiscrimination laws after adoption of the ADA. 1 10 Be-
cause the New Jersey Superior Court had previously held that AIDS 
was a disability111 but did not reach the issue of whether HIV infection 
was a disability, the New Jersey legislature saw fit to remove "any legal 
ambiguity with respect to the protection of [persons who are HIV pos-
itive] against discrimination."1l2 Such enactments are consistent with 
the argument of some commentators that despite the apparent pro-
tection of federal law, states have a significant role in addressing HIV-
based discrimination. 113 The adoption of HIV-specific statutes ap-
pears to be acceptable to some legislatures because HIV infection, 
with its significant history of social discrimination, can be comfortably 
distinguished from other disabilities, thus justifYing specialized legisla-
tion. Furthermore, state nondiscrimination standards may provide 
protection that exceeds that of the ADA. For example, the remedies 
available in the private cause of action created under the ADA's Title 
III public accommodation provisions are limited to injunctive relief, 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1994). 
1l0. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1 and 10:5-
5(q), (gg) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). 
llI. See PofI v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987). 
112. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 1993) (reprinting statement of Assembly Health & 
Human Services Committee). 
113. See Karen S. Lovitch, State AIDS-Related Legislation in the 19905: Adopting a Language of 
Hope Which Affirms Life, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1187, 1193-97 (1996) (recommending state HIV-
specific nondiscrimination laws). 
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not compensatory or punitive damagesY4 As a result, several courts 
have held that the claims of HIV-positive plaintiffs against health care 
professionals who have refused to provide services on the basis of the 
patients' HIV status are moot in cases in which the plaintiff has ob-
tained the needed health care service from another provider.1l5 The 
ADA's Title I employment discrimination provisions are limited to 
employers of fifteen or more employeesY6 Many state nondiscrimi-
nation laws cover smaller workplaces. For example, the Maine 
Human Rights Act-invoked by Sidney Abbott along with the ADA-. 
covers all employers in the state of Maine without regard to number 
of employeesY 7 Similarly, the federal Fair Housing Act is limited to 
residential, non-commercial housing opportunities,118 while the laws 
of many states are not so limitedY9 State law protection fulfills an 
important need in supplementing the ADA in these areas. 
In reality, however, the majority of state enactments closely track 
the ADA definition of disability. The federal definition may be attrac-
tive to state legislatures for several reasons. That definition has been 
subject to federal agency and judicial interpretation, and thus state 
legislatures may consider its meaning to be settled. Additionally, that 
definition may be viewed as politically noncontroversial, given its pre-
vious adoption by Congress and continuous acceptance and use in 
federal law. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the use of a defini-
tion consistent with federal law makes the state eligible for "deferral 
agency" status, resulting in work-sharing agreements by which the 
state agency receives federal funding to investigate and process cross-
filed discrimination complaints. 
Two kinds of state and local statutes exist throughout the country 
that afford protection for individuals with HIV infection. The first, 
state and local disability laws, may include HIV infection within the 
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), incorporated by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(I) 
(1994). 
115. See Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., 912 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (dismis-
sal for lack of standing to challenge clinic's mandatory HIV testing requirement); Hoepfl v. 
Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1995) (dismissal for lack of standing to challenge sur-
geon's refusal to treat HIV-infected patient); see alsoJairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (noting lack of standing for ADA claim against surgeon for refusal to treat on 
basis of HIV status; dismissal reversed, and remand to state court directed). 
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5)(A) (1994). 
117. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999). 
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1994). In some cases, however, such claims may be 
brought under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7) 
(1994). 
119. New York law, for example, covers commercial properties. SeeSeitzman v. Hudson 
River Assoc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (successful discrimination claim 
against landlord of physicians whose practice included AIDS patients). 
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definition of "disability," thus leaving no question as to the coverage 
of individuals with or regarded as having HN. The second, HN-spe-
cific laws (relating, for example, to privacy, anti-discrimination, and 
testing) may include express or implicit references to HN infection 
that also could provide effective redress. 
All states have adopted statutes that prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of disability. 120 Development of disability nondiscrimination 
law at the state level, however, has not been uniform or consistent, 
and although many state statutes share certain characteristics, in the 
realm of HN nondiscrimination standards, state-by-state statutory 
analysis and classification reveals significant variations in coverage of 
HIV. Historically, some states premised their definition of disability 
on the notion that a significant and permanent impairment of ambu-
latory ability or other physical functioning, which could be verified by 
medical examination, was required.121 Many states, however, adopted 
a definition that is consistent with, if not identical to, the federal statu-
tory definition as set forth initially in the Rehabilitation Act and re-
peated in the ADA, which provides a less restrictive definition of 
impairment in terms of severity and duration, as well as extending 
protection to individuals discriminated against based on a record of 
disability or the perception of disability. The enactment of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act in 1990 provided further impetus for state 
adoption of the federal statutory standard. This definition is now the 
most widely used, and at least thirty-nine states have at least one stat-
ute that contains this definition in some form. Interpreters of these 
laws frequently reference federal regulations or case law directly inter-
preting the federal definition of disability. Several states, however, 
have adopted statutory definitions that are apparently more inclusive 
than the federal definition, typically by relaxing the requirement that 
the impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.122 Some 
120. See Lovitch, supra note 113, at 1196. 
121. The South Carolina Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons, for example, defines 
"handicap" as "a substantial physical or mental impairment ... acquired by ... disease, 
where the impairment is verified by medical findings and appears reasonably certain to 
continue throughout the lifetime of the individual without substantial improvement." S.C. 
CoDE ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
122. New York, for example, defines "disability" as 
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physio-
logical, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a nor-
mal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or 
laboratory diagnostic techniques, or (b) a record of such an impairment, or (c) a 
condition regarded by others as such an impairment. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
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state statutes, however, refer to "handicap" or "disability" but do not 
include any definition of those terms. 
In response to the widespread problem of discrimination against 
individuals with HIV, the lack of clarity regarding coverage under 
state law, and the Justice Department's interpretation in 1986 against 
Rehabilitation Act coverage of HIV infection as an infectious dis-
ease,123 some states and many local governments adopted HIV-specific 
statutes. Many states also adopted HIV testing and confidentiality stat-
utes and included restrictions on the discriminatory use of testing or 
test results in some of these statutes. 
Interpretation and analysis of state law to determine the scope of 
HIV coverage presents several complex challenges. First, the specific 
statutory language, on its face, may allow more than one reasonable 
interpretation or application. Although state nondiscrimination en-
forcement agencies frequently interpret these statutory provisions, the 
weight to be given such interpretations is not always clear. Such inter-
pretations may be issued informally and may not be adopted subse-
quently by a reviewing court. A definitive interpretation of state law 
by the highest appellate court of the state, on the other hand, might 
settle questions of interpretation, but as noted below, only one such 
ruling has emerged that currently stands as a valid precedent. Of 
course, a ruling by the highest court in the state is itself subject to 
interpretation, clarification, or modification in subsequent cases. 
Generalization regarding the status of HIV infection under state law is 
further confounded by the fact that many states have more than one 
disability nondiscrimination law. The definitions of disability con-
tained in these laws may not be uniform. Clearly then, for many 
states, statutory interpretation and classification is more an art than a 
science. Nevertheless, this survey at least offers conclusions about the 
general contours of state law addressing HIV. 
A. State HIV-Specific Statutes 
The issue of whether HIV infection 124 is a protected category for 
purposes of nondiscrimination statutes is perhaps best answered by 
inclusion of that term in the statute itself. Only sixteen states (includ-
ing Puerto Rico), however, have enacted statutes that include the 
term "HIV infection," or equivalent terminology, that clearly does not 
123. Reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAw 286 (William H.L. Dornette ed., 1st ed. 1987). 
124. Throughout the discussion which follows, all references to "HIV" or "HIV infec-
tion" are to asymptomatic infection, unless noted otherwise. 
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require any disease symptoms. 125 Of these, only seven include HIV as 
a disability with protection equivalent to that of other disabilities as 
defined by state law.126 The other nine states offer protection more 
limited in scope than that afforded other disabilities.127 In that re-
gard, HIV is rare among medical conditions to be explicitly named by 
statute. The general trend in state law, as discussed below, has been 
not to include reference to specific conditions as disabilities. Assum-
ing that a legislature wishes to extend coverage in this area, there is no 
logical basis for covering individuals with AIDS but not those with 
HIV. Narrow legislation, such as that of New Hampshire which pro-
hibits landlords from evicting tenants "solely on the grounds that the 
[tenant] has [AIDS] or is regarded to have [AIDS],"128 is unique on 
the state level. 
In five states HIV is defined as equivalent to other disabilities as 
defined by state law by simply incorporating HIV in the definition of 
"disability" contained in state nondiscrimination laws. 129 Iowa, for ex-
ample, provides that the definition of disability in its Civil Rights Act, 
which protects against discrimination in public and private employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations, includes "the condition 
of a person with a positive human immunodeficiency virus test result, 
a diagnosis of [AIDS], a diagnosis of [ARC], or any other condition 
related to [AIDS]."13o New Jersey and Nebraska take the same ap-
proach. New Jersey's definition of "handicap" includes "AIDS or HIV 
infection."131 "HIV infection," in turn, is defined as "infection with 
the human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus identi-
fied as a probable causative agent of AIDS."132 The Nebraska Individ-
ual Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and private 
employment, housing, education, and public accommodations on the 
basis that the individual discriminated against "is suffering or is sus-
125. Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Vennont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. These 
states are identified in the accompanying Appendix A, column A. 
126. Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico. Con-
sult the accompanying compilation of state statutes in Appendix B for specific citation to 
statutory provisions. 
127. Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Vennont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. 
128. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1O.Vl (1999). 
129. See FlA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(5) (West 
Supp. 1999); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-167 
(1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1999). 
130. IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(5) (West Supp. 1999). 
131. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1999). 
132. Id. § 1O:5-5(gg). 
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pected of suffering from human immunodeficiency virus infection or 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome."133 Similarly, Florida provides 
that "[a]ny person with or perceived as having ... human immu-
nodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available to handi-
capped persons."134 This definition is applicable then to several 
Florida statutes that provide nondiscrimination standards in public 
and private employment, housing, and education (including employ-
ment by educational facilities). Florida law also specifies two addi-
tional contexts in which HIV-based discrimination is unlawful. First, 
entities receiving state financial assistance may not discriminate 
against an otherwise qualified individual in housing, public accommo-
dations, or government services on the basis that the individual is "in-
fected with [HIV] ."135 Next, Florida courts are prohibited from 
denying "shared parental responsibility, custody, or visitation rights to 
a parent or grandparent solely because that parent or grandparent is 
or is believed to be infected with [HIV] ."136 Finally, Colorado137 and 
Puerto Rico138 have broad, legislatively declared policies against HIV 
discrimination. Although these policy declarations do not include a 
reference to a specific enforcement mechanism, they compel the con-
clusion that HIV is a disability under general disability non-discrimina-
tion laws of those jurisdictions. 
Other states that have adopted HIV-specific standards have not 
done so as broadly. Hawaii, for example, prohibits discrimination in 
housing on the basis of HIV,139 but does not extend such explicit pro-
tection in other categories, such as employment and public accommo-
dations. Kentucky's HIV-specific statute provides that "[a]ny person 
with [AIDS], [ARC], or human immunodeficiency virus shall have 
every protection made available to individuals with disabilities under 
the employment nondiscrimination provisions of Kentucky Revised 
Statutes and Section 504 [of] the Rehabilitation AC,t of 1973."140 Simi-
larly, both Vermont141 and Washington142 limit their HIV protection 
133. NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-168 (1997). 
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997). 
135. Id. § 760.50(4)(a)-(b). 
136. Id. § 61.13(6). 
137. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1401 (West Supp. 1999). 
138. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 1, § 521 (1999). 
139. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1999). 
140. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). Presumably, even if the 
Rehabilitation Act were interpreted not to cover HIV, individuals with HIV would never-
theless have the same rights as individuals with disabilities under the cross-referenced Ken-
tucky law. Apparently the Kentucky legislature did not anticipate that the Rehabilitation 
Act could be read not to cover HIV. 
141. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(6)-(7) (Lexis Supp. 1999). 
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to public and private employment and do not include other settings, 
such as housing or public accommodations. Discrimination in those 
settings is covered under another statute that does not specify HIV.143 
Maryland,! 44 Virginia,145 and Wisconsin 146 require public safety per-
sonnel not to discriminate on the basis of HIV status. Montana law 
provides that a "health care facility may not refuse to admit a person 
to the facility solely because the person has an HIV-related condi-
tion."147 That law provides that "HIV-related condition means any 
medical condition resulting from an HIV infection, including but not 
limited to seropositivity for HIV."148 
North Carolina's HIV-specific statute is unique in that although it 
specifically references HIV and purports to grant protection from dis-
crimination on that basis, it actually authorizes as lawful as many 
forms of discrimination as it declares unlawful. The North Carolina 
Communicable Disease Act (NCCDA) prohibits discrimination in con-
tinued employment, housing, public services, public accommodations, 
and public transportation against "any person having AIDS virus or 
HIV infection on account of that infection."149 The NCCDA also pro-
hibits the use or requirement of HIV testing to determine suitability 
for continued employment, housing, public services, public accommo-
dations, and public transportation.150 However, the NCCDA allows 
HIV testing of job applicants, denial of employment to job applicants 
based on HIV status, and HIV testing as an annual medical examina-
tion routinely required of all employees by an employer. Reassign-
ment or termination of employment is allowed if the employee poses 
142. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 49.60.172 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000). 
143. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 
Supp. 2000). 
144. See MD. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-213(m) (Supp. 1999) (mandating that fire 
fighters, emergency medical technicians, rescue squads, law enforcement officers, and cor-
rectional officers "may not refuse to treat or transport an individual because the individual 
is HlV positive"); Id. § 18-213.2(h) (mandating that correctional officers, first responders, 
law enforcement officers, medical care facilities, and physicians performing postmortem 
exams are prohibited from discrimination in regard to the transportation of HlV positive 
decedents) . 
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.2 (Michie 1997) (stating that public safety agencies 
include the sheriff's office, adult or youth correctional, law enforcement, and fire safety 
organizations, or any governmental agency or department that employs persons who have 
law enforcement authority). 
146. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.14 (West 1999) (prohibiting discrimination by health 
care providers, peace officers, fire figh ters, correctional officers, state patrol officers, jail-
ers, home health agencies, and inpatient health care facilities). 
147. MONT. CoDE ANN. § 50-5-105(2) (a) (1999). 
148. Id. § 50-5-105(2)(b)(ii). 
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1999). 
150. See id. § 130A-148(i). 
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a significant risk to himself or others, or if the employee is unable to 
pertorm the normally assigned duties of the job. The NCCDA also 
allows licensed health care providers and facilities to discriminate 
against patients with HIV infection "to protect the health care pro-
vider or employees of the provider or employees of the facility while 
providing appropriate care" and to refer the patient with HIV to an-
other provider or facility "when such referral is for the purpose of 
providing more appropriate treatment."I5I The disingenuous nature 
of this "protective" enactment is obvious. 152 In sum, of the sixteen 
states with HIV-specific statutes, only seven provide "across the board" 
protection (although one of these, Florida, does not include public 
accommodations); eight provide coverage equivalent to other disabili-
ties, but limit that coverage to certain contexts or settings of varying 
scope; and one state, North Carolina, allows significantly greater dis-
crimination against individuals with HIV than it or federal law allows 
against individuals with other disabilities. 
In light of questions now raised as to whether HIV infection is or 
is not a disability under the general definition used in federal law, as 
well as in the laws of many states, HIV-specific legislation takes on a 
new significance. Depending on how such provisions are drafted, 
however, HIV-specific statutes may be interpreted to mean that HIV is 
not included in more general definitions of disability. The explicit 
inclusion of HIV in one provision indicates, arguably, that HIV is not 
covered by a general definition included in some other statute or pro-
vision. If it were, there would be no need for the HIV-specific enact-
ment. For example, Hawaii's HIV-specific housing provisionI53 may 
be interpreted to mean that HIV is not covered under the general 
disability definition applicable to employment discrimination. Addi-
tionally, inclusion of HIV infection might be construed as an indica-
tion that other infectious diseases were intended to be omitted from 
coverage. To avoid this statutory construction, the Iowa Civil Rights 
Act provides that the inclusion of positive HIV test results within the 
definition of disability "does not preclude" the inclusion of other 
"conditions resulting from other contagious or infectious diseases" 
within that definition.154 
151. [d. § 130A-148(j). 
152. See Jeremy McKinney, Comment, HIV, AIDS & Job Discrimination: North Carolina's 
Failure and Federal Redemption, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 115 (1995); Angela Sue Bullard, North 
Carolina's New AIDS Discrimination Protection: Who Do They Think They're Fooling, 12 CAMPBELL 
L. REv. 475 (1990). 
153. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (Michie 1993). 
154. IOWA CoDE ANN. § 216.2 (West Supp. 1999). 
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Finally, as described above, some HIV-specific statutes cover HIV-
infected individuals, but not those perceived to be infected or those 
with a positive HIV test result. If read literally, this version of the HIV-
specific definition would exclude from coverage individuals who have 
tested or appear to have tested positive but who are not in fact in-
fected with HIV. Such individuals would include infants who have 
their mother's antibodies to HIV, vaccine trial participants, and indi-
viduals with false positive test results or medical records erroneously 
indicating a positive test result. 
B. State Law Limitations on Use of HIV Testing or Test Results155 
After a reliable test for HIV antibodies became widely available in 
1985 and the evils resulting from the misuse of such testing became 
known, many states adopted informed consent for testing and HIV-
related information confidentiality statutes. Because breaches of con-
fidentiality frequently result in discrimination (and in many cases are 
motivated by an interest in discriminating against an individual with 
HIV), some states also adopted statutes that prohibit the use of HIV 
test results to discriminate against any individual who has been tested 
or has tested positive or that prohibit HIV testing for purposes, such 
as employment screening where testing is not fully voluntary and the 
results will be used to discriminate. As a result, these "information 
restrictive" statutes appear to protect from discrimination based on 
knowledge of test results, not actual or perceived HIV status. 
Twelve states have adopted statutes that impose limitations on the 
use of HIV testing or HIV test results for discriminatory purposes.156 
Of the twelve states in this category, only three impose broad restric-
tions on the use of such information in employment, public accom-
modations, housing, and other areas. 157 Six states impose restrictions 
155. This survey does not include the many state statutes that address the problem of 
transactions involving "stigmatized" real estate owned or occupied by someone with HIV / 
AIDS. These statutes frequently abrogate any duty on the part of the seller or realtor to 
disclose any HIV-related stigmatizing information to potential buyers and thus may limit 
buyers' ability to discriminate against a seller with AIDS, but they do not address the issue 
of discrimination directly. Thus, for example, if a potential buyer of such a property 
chooses not to bid on a property because of stigma, or offers a low bid because of 
knowledge of the stigma, there is typically no remedy under such statutes. For a general 
discussion of this issue, see AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 6.12 (David W. Webber ed., 
3d ed. 1997). 
156. Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island and Texas. These states are identified in the accompanying 
Appendix A, column B. 
157. Hawaii, Kansas and Rhode Island. 
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only in the employment context.158 Two states impose limits on HIV 
testing and the use of results do so in the health care context.159 One 
state, Ohio, prohibits discrimination by health care providers, public 
services and publicly-funded services. 16o In the case of some states, 
such as Florida, it is not clear that the adoption of nondiscrimination 
standards applicable to HIV information adds or necessarily clarifies 
nondiscrimination standards, given that the state also has broad non-
discrimination provisions separate from the information restrictive 
statute. 161 Nevertheless, such enactments may be valuable in enhanc-
ing public awareness of the confidentiality provisions applicable to 
HIV information. 
Although these testing and confidentiality statutes may offer pro-
tection in many instances, if read literally they provide significantly 
weaker protection than nondiscrimination enactments that define dis-
criminatory conduct and the protected category more broadly. For 
example, s'tatutes that restrict use of HIV test results in the employ-
ment context may be interpreted by the courts not to protect the job 
applicant who is discriminated against because the potential em-
ployer, who is not aware of a specific test result, is aware only of ru-
mors that the applicant is HIV infected. In that case, the information 
relied on is not derived (at least directly) from any HIV test result, and 
to protect that applicant, it could be argued, would not serve the pur-
pose of enhancing confidentiality for HIV test results and prohibiting 
their misuse. But under a statute that provides protection based on 
HIV status, either actual or perceived, protection from discrimination 
is significantly strengthened. As another example of the limited scope 
of these laws, Maryland's HIV informed consent testing statute pro-
vides that refusal to undergo HIV testing may not be used "as the sole 
basis by an institution or laboratory to deny services or treatment."162 
Such enactments may protect the limited group of individuals who 
might refuse testing and would not be protected under other nondis-
crimination laws, either because they could not successfully claim to 
have been perceived to be HIV infected or because state law does not 
protect from discrimination on that basis. On its face, however, the 
Maryland statute would not reach refusal to treat based on HIV status 
itself. Some of these information restrictive statutes provide protec-
158. California, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico and Texas. 
159. Arkansas and Maryland. 
160. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.245(A) (Anderson 1999). 
161. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50 (West 1997). 
162. MD. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-336(c) (Supp. 1999). 
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tion from inquiries regarding HIV testing or the results of such. 
testing. 
There are no reported decisions that interpret these statutes, but 
in one case in an analogous setting, Urbaniak v. Newton,163 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted the California confidential-
ity statute, limiting its application to disclosure of HIV test results by 
individuals having access to the record of such results. l64 In that case, 
at the conclusion of an examination by a physician retained by the 
plaintiff's worker compensation insurer, the plaintiff disclosed his 
HIV status to a nurse so that she would comply with infection control 
precautions and avoid transmission of HIV to herself or others.165 
The physician, however, disclosed the HIV information to several 
third parties without the plaintiffs knowledge or consent. l66 The 
Court of Appeals concluded that because the legislature's intent in 
enacting the statute was to encourage individuals with HIV to seek 
testing and treatment, the confidentiality statute's application was lim-
ited to "persons and institutions that conduct tests for AIDS, assume 
responsibility for custody or distribution of test results, or use test re-
sults in connection with treatment of [sic] affected person."167 The 
physician's disclosure of the plaintiff's HIV status thus did not violate 
the statute. 168 
C. State Law Incorporation of Federal Disability Standards 
By far, the largest category of states incorporates the federal disa-
bility standard as generally set forth in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and other federal statutes.169 Thirty-nine states use this definition 
163. 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For a criticism of this ruling as a "cramped 
reading" of the California statute, see Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HIV-
Related InfMmation: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the 
AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REv. lll, 143-45 (1994). 
164. See Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
165. See id. at 356. 
166. See id. 
167. Id. at 362. 
168. See id. 
169. For purposes of this discussion and the accompanying Compilation of State Stat-
utes, the "federal disability standard" defines "disability" as an impairment that imposes a 
substantial limitation on a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or the per-
ception of such an impairment, as discussed more fully supra at text accompanying notes 
22-30. While there is no federal statutory definition of "impairment" or "major life activ-
ity," some state statutes in this category incorporate the federal regulatory definitions for 
these terms, although they stop short of incorporating any of the regulations' specific ref-
erences to HIV as an impairment or a disability. States using these definitions are identi-
fied in the accompanying Appendix A, column C. Delaware's employment discrimination 
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in one or more statute,170 and of these states, eighteen states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Guam do not have any specific HIV statutory 
protection. 171 In these states, protection for HIV infection, if it exists, 
is based on these statutes. Additionally, among the eighteen states 
with HIV-specific statutes of limited application or statutes that pro-
hibit discriminatory use of HIV testing or test results in only limited 
settings,172 fourteen also use the federal standard to define "disability" 
for at least some purpose under state law.173 As a result, the federal 
disability standard significantly effects the rights of individuals with 
HIV in at least thirty-two states. 
In some states, the state administrative agencies responsible for 
enforcement at the administrative level have interpreted the statute as 
including HIV infection. Whether these interpretations would be ac-
cepted by a state court interpreting the statute is open to question. 
Nevertheless, such agency interpretations at least assure potential 
complainants that a claim of discrimination based on HIV status will 
be accepted by the enforcement agency. 
These state statutory definitions pose difficulties in interpretation 
in regard to the impact of federal court decisions interpreting analo-
gous provisions under federal law. The California Fair Employment 
and Housing Act (FEHA) , for example, prohibits discrimination 
based on physical or mental "disability" and "medical condition" in 
public and private employment, housing, and professional licensure, 
and incorporates the federal definition of disability.174 However, no 
reported California court decision has directly addressed the question 
of whether asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under California 
law, although one trial court has so ruled in an unreported deci-
sion.175 Decisions involving symptomatic HIV illness or other condi-
law is arguably broader than federal law in its definition of disability, and Indiana's hous-
ing discrimination law provides a definition broader than that of federal law. 
170. See Appendix A, column C. 
171. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. Courts in Minnesota and West Virginia have 
also held that HIV infection is a disability. See infra text and accompanying notes 195 and 
199. 
172. Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas,' Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, Wisconsin. 
173. Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix A, column C. 
174. CAL. GoV'T CoDE §§ 12955.3, 12926(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
175. See CalifomiaJudge Awards $729,000 to HN-Positive Discharged Empliryee, 88 DAILY LAB. 
REp., May 10, 1994, at A5 (summarizing Perrault v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., No. 707306-7 
(Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County May 6, 1994». 
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tions shed some light on the interpretation of this concept under 
California law. Thus, the California Supreme Court has ruled that the 
potential for a medical condition to become disabling in the future is 
enough to establish it as a current disability.176 AIDS itself has been 
recognized as a disability in part because of the potentially debilitating 
future effects of the illness,177 but other rulings suggest that such a 
reading of the FEHA may be unjustifiably broad. 178 Accordingly, the 
precise meaning of the FEHA may be open to some question until a 
definitive ruling is issued by the California Supreme Court. Similarly, 
California's Unruh Civil Rights Ace 79 prohibits discrimination based 
on "disability" in public accommodations or business establishments, 
as does the Disabled Persons Act,180 which incorporates the federal 
definition of disability. One federal district court has concluded, al-
beit with little discussion of the issue, that HIV infection is a disability 
for purposes of the Unruh ACt. 181 The FEHA and Unruh Act take the 
ADA as establishing at least a minimum non-discrimination standard, 
and thus a violation of the ADA is deemed a violation of these state 
laws.182 Yet, as discussed above, given the current state of federal 
court interpretation of the ADA, the precise contours of its protection 
of individuals with HIV have not been defined. Furthermore, Brag-
don-like defenses, challenging HIV as a disability under state disability 
definitions, could be litigated under state law in any case in which HIV 
is the claimed disability. Bragdon, based as it is exclusively on an inter-
pretation of federal law, might be persuasive but not controlling au-
thority in such cases. Such defenses would be foreclosed only in states 
such as California and Kentucky, which provide that their statutes are 
to be interpreted consistently with federal law or in California's case 
that federal law establishes a minimum standard for nondis-
crimination. 
176. See American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151, 
1155-56 (Cal. 1982) (classifying hypertension as a disability). 
177. See Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment & HOllS. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 
197, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (AIDS diagnosis, but noting that condition need not be 
presently disabling to qualify as a physical handicap). 
178. See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) (summarizing 
legislative history of FEHA disability provisions in regard to federal law and rejecting a 
claim that obesity is a disability). 
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982). 
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 54 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). 
181. See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding 
that HIV infection is a disability under the Unruh Act for purposes of establishing a claim 
of "associational" discrimination). 
182. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). 
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D. State Statutory Definitions oj Disability Not Adopting the 
Federal Standard 
299 
Fourteen states employ a definition of disability in at least one 
nondiscrimination statute that either departs significantly from the 
federal standard or does not set forth any definition. While these stat-
utes are open to varying interpretation, eight of these states appear to 
define "disability" more broadly than does federal law,183 while one 
state, Texas, appears to define it more narrowly. The remaining five 
states do not include any comprehensive statutory definition.184 
Unlike the federal definition, which includes the requirement 
that the impairment result in a substantial limitation on major life 
activity, the states that define "disability" more broadly than the fed-
eral standard typically do not impose any requirement regarding se-
verity. Instead, these states require that there be a documented 
impairment. In these states, courts and enforcement agencies may be 
more likely to regard HIV infection as a disability and less likely to 
find rulings by federal courts persuasive in interpreting state law. 
Most notably in this category, the New York Human Rights Law 
(NYHRL) defines "disability" as 
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from 
anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions 
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is 
demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory di-
agnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment 
or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment 185 . 
Several New York state court decisions indicate that there is no ques-
tion that HIV is covered under this definition.186 Nevertheless, other 
courts have noted that the NYHRL's definition of disability is stricter, 
not broader, than that of federal law.187 These decisions appear to 
183. Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and 
Oregon. 
184. Alabama (as to public employment, housing, and public accommodations), Arkan-
sas (as to public accommodations and housing), Mississippi (as to public employment, 
employment by state-funded employers), Washington (as to public accommodations, hous-
ing, and real estate transactions, financing, and credit), and Wyoming (as to public and 
private employment). Note, however, that the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission 
Rules of Practice incorporate the federal definition of disability. 
185. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McIGnney 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
186. See, e.g., Petri v. Bank of New York Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (1992) (holding that 
asymptomatic HIV infection, whether actual or perceived, is disability under New York 
law). 
187. See Scott v. Flaghouse, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Aquinas v. Federal 
Express Corp., 940 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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ignore the second element of the definition, which includes impair-
ments that are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or labora-
tory diagnostic techniques. Similarly, in terms of broader-than-federal 
protection, the Connecticut Human Rights and Opportunities Act de-
fines "physical disability" as a "chronic physical handicap, infirmity or 
impairment, whether congenital or ... from illness .... "188 Because 
HIV infection is likely to be deemed a chronic physical impairment 
resulting from illness,189 such a statute provides a strong case for cov-
erage of HIV infection. Again, the Illinois Human Rights Act prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of "handicap," which is defined as a 
"determinable physical or mental characteristic of a person, ... the 
history of such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic 
by the person complained against, which may result from disease 
.... "190 The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the Illinois stat-
ute to cover HIV infection.191 The Indiana Equal Access to Housing 
for Persons with Disabilities Law defines an individual with a disability 
as "an individual who, by reason of physical or mental defect or infir-
mity, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury, or disease, is 
or may subsequently be totally or partially prevented from achieving 
the fullest attainable, physical, social, economic, mental and voca-
tional participation in the normal process of living."192 The Maryland 
Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and private em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, retail services and by per-
sons licensed or regulated by the State Department of Licensing and 
Regulations on the basis of physical or mental handicap, or perceived 
handicap, which is defined as "any physical disability . . . which is 
d b '11 "193 cause y... 1 ness . . . . 
Texas, however, maintains standards that appear to be narrower 
than federal law. The Texas Rights and Responsibilities of Persons 
with Disabilities Act defines "disability" as a "mental or physical disabil-
ity, including mental retardation, hearing impairment, deafness, 
speech impairment, visual impairment, or any health impairment that 
requires special ambulatory devices or services."194 Thus, asymptom-
atic conditions would not likely be covered by this definition. 
188. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51 (15) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999). 
189. See, e.g., Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 
1136, 1141 (Ill. 1996), affg 655 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995). 
190. 775 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). 
191. See Raintree Health Care Ctr., 672 N.E.2d at 1141. 
192. IND. CoDE ANN. § 22-% (West 1997). 
193. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 49B, § 15(g) (Michie 1957 & Supp. 1991). 
194. TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.002(4) (West Supp. 1998). 
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E. Judicial Interpretations of State Nondiscrimination Law 
Given the considerable ambiguity in state law on the question of 
coverage of HIV infection, some clarification of standards might be 
expected from the state courts themselves or from federal courts ap-
plying state law. To date, however, the highest courts of appeal in 
only three states have addressed this issue. Two of those rulings, Ben-
jamin R v. Orkin Exterminating CO.,195 and Burgess v. Your House of Ra-
leigh, Inc.,196 involved state law issues that were affected by subsequent 
legislation,197 and thus those rulings are oflimited precedential value. 
But in a third ruling, Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights 
Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court held that HIV infection is a 
disability under the Illinois Human Rights Act, given that statute's def-
inition of disability as "a determinable physical characteristic resulting 
from a disease."198 Because of the specific state statutory language on 
which that ruling is based, however, it may be of limited precedential 
value in most states, especially those that have adopted the federal 
definition. 
Several state intermediate appellate and federal courts, applying 
state law, have addressed the issue of HIV infection as a disability. In 
Beaulieu v. Clausen,199 the Minnesota Court of Appeals has interpreted 
the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) to cover asymptomatic 
HIV infection.2oo The MHRA's definition of "disability" follows that of 
federal law, and the court concluded that individuals with HIV are 
materially limited in several major life activities, including social par-
ticipation (because of emotional or psychological problems such as 
depression as well as ostracism by others), sexual and reproductive 
activities, and employment.201 In Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys-
tems,202 a federal district court noted, albeit with little discussion, that 
HIV is a disability under Michigan law, which incorporates the federal 
195. 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990) (recognizing that subsequent legislation conformed 
statute in question more closely to federal law, although court's reasoning in concluding 
that HIV imposes a substantial limitation on major life activities may be persuasive under 
the subsequent legislation and that of other states). 
196. 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990). This case was decided before the adoption of North 
Carolina's Communicable Disease Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148 (i) , prohibiting discrim-
ination in continuing employment. 
197. See Burgess, 388 S.E.2d at 141-42; Benjamin R 390 S.E.2d at 816 n.5. 
198. Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136, 
1141 (Ill. 1996), affg 655 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 775 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/1-lO3(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997». 
199. 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
200. See id. at 666. 
201. See id. 
202. 892 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
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definition of disability.203 Similarly, in Kotev v. First Colony Life Insur-
ance CO.,204 a federal district court concluded, without discussion, that 
HIV infection is a disability under the California's Unruh Act for pur-
poses of establishing a claim of "associational" discrimination.205 In 
Rose City Oil Co. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights,206 the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals ruled that an individual discriminated against 
on the basis of perception of HIV infection was not protected under 
Missouri law.207 That decision was reversed by legislation.208 
Several rulings by New York courts have accepted HIV infection 
as a disability, given New York's broad definition of that term. In one 
case, Petri v. Bank oj New York CO.,209 the Supreme Court for the 
County of New York ruled that asymptomatic HIV infection, whether 
perceived or actual, is a disability under New York state law.210 More 
recently, in Cahill v. Rosa,211 the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 
favor of a patient with HIV infection on the question of whether a 
dentist's office is a public accommodation.212 HIV infection has been 
assumed to be a disability in several other cases reported in the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.213 
Although there is no question that HIV infection is covered by 
New Jersey's statutory definition of "handicap,"214 in Poff v. Caro,215 
the court held that New Jersey law prohibits housing discrimination 
based on perception that an individual has AIDS or might be at risk 
for AIDS, reasoning that there is no logical basis for distinguishing 
between those with a disability and those so perceived.216 This reason-
ing would apply as well in cases of HIV infection. 
203. See id. at 180. 
204. 927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
205. See id. at 1320. 
206. 832 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
207. See id. at 317. 
208. The Missouri HIV and Public Health Act provides that the Missouri Human Rights 
Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.137 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998), "shall apply to individ-
uals with HIV infection .... " Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.665 (West 1996). 
209. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1992). 
210. See id. at 611. 
211. 674 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1996). 
212. See id. at 277. 
213. See e.g., Doe v. Jamaica Hosp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (mem.); 
Syracuse Community Health Ctr. v. Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), 
aff'd, 659 N.E.2d 760 (N.Y. 1995). 
214. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(q) (West 1999). 
215. 549 A.2d 900 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987). 
216. See id. at 903. 
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Finally, in Abbott v. Bragdon, the First Circuit noted that its disposi-
tion of issues under the ADA was dispositive of those under Maine law 
as well, given the co-extensive coverage of the two statutes.217 
F. State Law Exclusion of Coverage for Communicable Diseases 
Only Georgia and Idaho include explicit exclusions of communi-
cable or infectious disease from their nondiscrimination standards.218 
Most states have abandoned these provisions in favor of "direct threat" 
provisions that parallel the "direct threat" provision in the ADA.219 
Other states have retained such exclusions in statutes governing spe-
cific occupations, such as food service workers.22o Generally, these 
statutes are interpreted as inapplicable in the context of HIV, given 
the well-established view that there is no risk of HIV transmission in 
the applicable workplaces. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina interpreted the former North Carolina Handicapped Per-
sons Protection Act221 as not applying to HIV infection because of the 
statutory exemption of "communicable diseases" from the definition 
of handicap.222 In a more recent case, however, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois rejected an employer's defense that public health regula-
tions required the dismissal of a food service employee with a "conta-
gious or infectious disease."223 But in Sanchez v. Lagoudakis,224 the 
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that an employer can require an em-
ployee, who is rumored to have AIDS, to undergo a medical examina-
tion to determine whether she can be safely employed as a waitress.225 
217. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937 n.l (1st Cir. 1997). 
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-GA-3 (1999); IDAHO CoDE § 67-5910 (1999). Kentucky also 
has a communicable disease exception, but that exception is limited by HIV-specific provi-
sions included in other Kentucky non-discrimination laws. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 207.140 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). 
220. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01, Subd. 35(2) (West 1999). 
221. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-I-12 (1987). 
222. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134, 138, 140 (N.C. 1990). 
North Carolina law has since been amended, and although its protection is limited, that 
specific exemption has been deleted. 
·223. Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136, 
1143-45 (Ill. 1996). 
224. 581 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1998). 
225. See id. at 265. 
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G. The Demographics of State HIV Non-Discrimination Standards 
Given the foregoing description of HN protective legal stan-
dards, the jurisdictions included in this survef26 can be placed into 
three categories. First, eleven states227 and Puerto Rico have clearly 
established protection for HN infection, either from explicit statutory 
language, judicial precedent, or a combination of both. Second, only 
four states228 and the U.S. Virgin Islands provide little or no protec-
tion for HN infection, primarily because of the lack of a disability 
nondiscrimination law of broad application. Finally, in the third and 
largest category are the remaining states, in which coverage of HN 
cannot be determined with certainty, given the lack of specific statu-
tory language pertaining to HN and the lack of judicial precedent on 
the question. In this third category, some states may in practice cover 
HN as a disability, and cases involving claims of HN discrimination 
may have resulted in successful settlements for plaintiffs with HN but 
without reported judicial opinions addressing the question of HN as a 
disability. The important point here, however, is the absence of clear, 
identifiable legal standards. Without such legal standards, persons or 
entities that might engage in discrimination on the basis of HN do 
not have a clear compliance standard, and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, individuals with HN have no assurance that they have legal 
protection. Public health strategies, such as HN case reporting, are 
frequently premised on the assurance of at least adequate nondiscrim-
ination standards. The absence of that assurance for a significant 
number of individuals with HN thus can have profound implications 
for public health policy. 
In order to determine roughly the proportionate extent that the 
population of individuals with HN is represented within the jurisdic-
tions as grouped in these three categories, comparisons of the propor-
tionate distribution of individuals with AIDS within these categories 
were calculated.229 The states in which protection for individuals can 
be said to be clearly established as a result of explicit statutory lan-
guage or court precedent include less than one-half (forty-six per-
cent) of the reported cases of AIDS. On the other hand, those 
226. We do not, however, take into account the impact that local legislation may have in 
protecting against HIV infection discrimination. 
227. Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, and New York. 
228. Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina. 
229. Because comparative state-by-state HIV infection data are not available, we use the 
most recent rates of AIDS cases as published in CDC, HIV / AIDS SURVEILLANCE REpORT 
(mid-year ed., June 1999) (table 1) as a rough estimate of the comparative extent of HIV 
infection in specific jurisdictions. 
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jurisdictions that significantly limit or have no protection for HIV in-
fection in major areas include approximately six percent of the re-
ported cases.230 Most significantly, however, because of the 
widespread reliance on the federal definition of disability, roughly 
half (forty-eight percent) of that population is reported in jurisdic-
tions in which the legal standards have a degree of uncertainty regard-
ing protection for individuals with HIV. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the states that do not have clear, identi-
fiable legal standards are almost exclusively those relying on the fed-
eral definition of disability. Thus, to the extent that Bragdon v. Abbott 
and L~e more recent Supreme Court ADA cases can be read as sup-
porting the conclusion that HIV infection is a disability, such cases 
should influence the interpretation of the disability definition in 
those states in the direction of inclusion of individuals with HIV. Ad-
ditionally, there appears to be no trend in the state courts, as there 
was at one point in the lower federal courts, to question whether HIV 
infection is a disability. On the contrary, the few precedents in this 
area indicate a trend towards including HIV as a disability. At this 
point, however, the question of whether and to what extent individu-
als with HIV infection are protected from discrimination under these 
state laws remains a question that is open to dispute. In that sense, 
now, a dozen years after the Presidential Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic called for a "strong national pol-
icy"231 against HIV discrimination, the law has not yet fully embodied 
that policy. 
230. Although this is a relatively small percentage, the actual number of individuals 
within this category is significant. The states in this category and the U.S. Virgin Islands all 
provide reports of confidential HIV test results. Based on these reports, the CDC, in its 
most recent report, reported that a total of 34,740 individuals were living with HIV or AIDS 
in those jurisdictions. The inadequacy of legal protections in these jurisdictions, it should 
be noted, is not the result of a failure to include asymptomatic HIV infection; these juris-
dictions also fail to provide any protection for AIDS or symptomatic HIV infection. 
231. See supra note 12. 
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APPENDIX A: 
HIV. INFECTION AS PROTECTED BY STATE STATUTE IN THE 
U.S. (INCLUDING GUAM, PUERTO RICO, AND 
THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS) 
Key to Table: 
A = Statute explicitly includes protection for HIV 
B = Statute bars discriminatory use of HIV testing or test information 
C = Statute uses "federal disability" standard 
D = Statute uses disability definition other than federal standard (or does not define term) 
E = Judicial precedent interprets statute as covering HIV infection 
F = No disability nondiscrimination law in at least one significant category 
Arrow symbol (+) indicates column referred to in comment 
I Alabama • • + No disability protection in private employment 
I Alaska • 
Arizona • 
An, + + • 
Prohibits health care ~. . I based on IllY test result; uses 
federal definition miDus "regarded as" clause 
+ + I:~~~~ I based on IllV test resul~ nu "",um 
+ • Legislature bas declared policy of IllY nondiscrintination 
Connecticut + Slate definition of disability broader than federal 
• + Slate definition of disability broader than federal for employment 
I District of Columbia • 
I Florida + • + IllY explicitly incorporated in handicap defInition; no "regarded as" clause 
I Georgia • + No coverage of public accommodations. housing. other areas 
I Guam + Uses tenn ··classified as" rather than "regarded as" 
I Hawaii + • • HIV protected in housing discrimination statute 
I Idaho • 
I Dlinois • + m. Coun of Appeals ruled that IllY is a disability 
I Indiana + Slate definition of disability broader than federal for housing 
I Iowa + IllY explicitly incorporated in handicap definition 
Kansas + • HIV case reporting data may not be used to discriminate 
Kentucky + • • Prohibits h~ing •. ~blic. I based~ ~ ~:::c services and 
Louisiana • 
Maine • • + 1st Cir. Ct. of Appeals ruled IllY is disability under state law 
Maryland + • • IllY discrimination by public safety personnel prohibited 
• 
Michigan • + Federal district court ruled that I-fiV is protected under state law 
• + Coun of Appeals ruled IllY a disability 
Mississippi • + No coverage of private employment and other areas 
I Missouri + • No coverage for "regarded as" IllY infected 
Montana + • Health care facilities may not refuse to admit persons with IllY 
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Nebraska + • Broad protection from discrimination based on mv 
Nevada • 
New Hampshire + • 
I Statut~ ~~~i~u evictions based on. having AIDS or being regarded as I having. • but not based on IflV 
New Jersey • + Superior Ct. ruled persons viewed at risk to develop AIDS covered 
New Mexico + • HIV test results may not be used to discriminate in employment 
New York + • State definition of disability broader than federal 
North Carolina + • Statute offers significantly less protection than federal law 
I North Dakota • 
IOhia + • No HIV discrimination in gov't services & gov't-funded services 
• 
Oregon • State definition of disability includes federal definition but is broader 
" • 
Puerto Rico + Legislatively declared policy of non-discrimination 
Rhode Island + • Discrimination based on "positive AIDS test" prohibited 
South Carolina • 
South Dakota • 
Tennessee • 
Texas + • • HIV testing for employment purposes prohibited 
Utah • 
Ivennont + • HIV discrimination in public and private employment prohibited 
V;,.;n Td, ,,', US + No prohibition against mv discrimination 
Virginia + + IIflV . I clause by public safety personnel prohibited; no "regarded as" 
·'0· + • HIV discrimination in public and private employment prohibited 
West Virginia • + W. Va Supreme Ct has ruled IflV a disability 
wisconsin + • HIV discrimination by public safety personnel prohibited 
Wyonting + "Federal disability" definition adopted by state agency 
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APPENDIXB: 
STATE HIV DISABILITY LAW COMPILATION 
(INCLUDING GUAM, PUERTO RICO, AND 
THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS)l 
For each state, law summaries are provided in this order: (1) HIV spe-
cific state nondiscrimination laws; (2) HIV testing or information laws; 
(3) general disability laws; (4) administrative or judicial interpreta-
tions of significance in regard to coverage of HIV infection. State 
agency interpretations and local ordinances have been included 
where available. 
AlABAMA 
Alabama's disability nondiscrimination law prohibits discrimination 
against the "physically disabled" in public employment, housing ac-
commodations, and public accommodations. ALA. CODE §§ 21-7-2 to 
21-7-9 (1997). "Physically disabled" is not defined by statute. 
The Alabama Fair Housing Law incorporates the federal definition of 
disability. ALA. CODE § 24-8-3(6) (1992 & Supp. 1999). 
Alabama does not have a disability nondiscrimination law applicable 
to private employers. 
ALASKA 
The Alaska Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment, housing, credit and financing, based on "disabil-
ity," and incorporates the federal definition of disability. ALAsKA 
STAT. § 18.80.300(9),(12)-(13) (Lexis Law Publishing 1998). 
ARIZONA 
The Arizona Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment and housing on the basis of "handicap." The defi-
nition of handicap incorporates the federal definition of disability. 
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461.4 (West Supp. 1999). The housing 
nondiscrimination provisions provide that "[h] andicap shall be de-
fined as the term is defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act." 
Id. § 14-1491.8. 
The Arizonians with Disabilities Act of 1992, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41-1492.5 (West Supp. 1999), prohibits discrimination in public ac-
1. The authors acknowledge the research assistance of Deborah Reichmann in 
preparing this compilation. Valuable comments on aspects of various local laws were 
provided by Ron Boyter, John Davidson, Justin Hayford, and David Schulman. 
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commodations and commercial facilities on the basis of disability, and 
incorporates the standards of Title III of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12184 (1994). 
ARKANSAS 
The Arkansas HIV Shield Law provides that "[h]ealth care providers 
or facilities may not deny appropriate care based upon the results of 
an HIV test." ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(d) (Lexis Law Publishing 
Supp. 1999). The HIV Shield Law does not include any enforcement 
provisions. 
The Arkansas Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment, public accommodations, property transactions, 
finance and credit, and voting and participation in the political pro-
cess on the basis of "any sensory, mental, or physical disability." "Disa-
bility" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits a major life function .... " ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) 
(Michie 1987 & Lexis Law Publishing Supp. 1999). 
The Arkansas Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing 
accommodations and real estate transactions on the basis of "disabil-
ity." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202 (Michie 1987 & Lexis Law Publish-
ing Supp. 1999). No statutory definition of "disability" is provided. 
The Arkansas disability discrimination law prohibits discrimination in 
public services, facilities, employment, public accommodations, and 
housing accommodations on the basis of "physical handicap." ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 20-14-303 (Michie 1991 & Lexis Law Publishing Supp. 
1999). No statutory definition of "physical handicap" is provided. 
CALIFORNIA 
California law prohibits the use of HIV test results for determining 
suitability for employment or insurability. CAL. HEALTH & SAFE'IY 
CODE § 120980(f) (West 1996). Similarly, participation in an HIV re-
search study may not be used to determine employability or insurabil-
ity of a research subject. [d. § 121115 (West 1996). 
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prohibits dis-
crimination based on "physical disability," "mental disability," or 
"medical condition" in public and private employment. CAL. GoV'T 
CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 2000). The definitions for "mental disabil-
ity" and "physical disability" explicitly use the federal definition as a 
floor for coverage. [d. § 12926(i), (k) (West Supp. 2000). It further 
prohibits discrimination based on "disability" with regard to housing 
accommodations. The definition of "disability" incorporates the fed-
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eral definition. Id. § 12955.3, (West Supp. 2000); see also CAL. CODE 
REGs. tit. 9, § 7025 (1999). 
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on 
"disability" in public accommodations or business establishments, as 
does the Disabled Persons Act, CAL. CIY. CODE § 54, which incorpo-
rates the federal definition of disability. A violation of the ADA is 
deemed a violation of these state laws. Id. § 51,54 (West Supp. 2000). 
California law prohibits discrimination against individuals with disal;>il-
ities, as defined by federal law, in programs or activities receiving fi-
nancial assistance from the state. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11135 (West 
1992 & Supp. 1998). 
COLORADO 
Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, housing, and public accommodation on the 
basis of "disability." The definition of "disability" incorporates the fed-
eral definition. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-301 (West 1990 & 
Supp. 1999). 
The Colorado legislature has issued a legislative declaration that "hav-
ing ... HIV infection, being presumed to have the HIV infection, or 
seeking testing for the presence of such infection should not serve as 
the basis for discriminatory actions or the prevention of access to serv-
ices." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1401 (West Supp. 1999). No en-
forcement provisions are included in this provision. 
In Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 793 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Colo. 
1991), ajf'd 991 F.2d 645, 650 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant con-
ceded that HIV infection is a disability under Colorado law. 
CONNECTICUT 
The Connecticut Human Rights and Opportunities Act prohibits 
"physical disability" discrimination in public and private employment, 
housing, public accommodations, and other areas. "Physical disabil-
ity" is defined as "chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, 
whether congenital or ... from illness .... " CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46a-51 (15) (West 1995 and Supp. 1999). 
Conn. Agencies Regs. § 46a-54-57 (1999) (authorizes use of pseudo-
nym for complaints referring to confidential HIV information); Id. 
§ 46a-54-41 (standards for the collection, use, maintenance, and re-
lease of confidential HIV-related information). 
HeinOnline -- 3 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 311 1999-2000
2000] "DISABILrIy" UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAw 311 
DELAWARE 
The Delaware Handicapped Persons Employment Protections Act 
(DHPEPA) prohibits discrimination in public and private employ-
ment and incorporates the federal definition of disability, but defines 
"substantially limits" to mean that the "impairment so affects a person 
as to create a likelihood that such person will experience difficulty in 
securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of a handi-
cap." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(4) (1995). The definition of "re-
garded as having an impairment" includes "a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities because of the 
attitudes of others." Id. The DHPEPA further provides that the "re-
garded as" having an impairment provision "is intended to be inter-
preted in conformity with the federal Rehabilitation Act." Id. 
The Delaware Fair Housing Act incorporates the federal definition of 
disability. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4602(14) (1999). 
The Delaware Equal Accommodations Law incorporates the federal 
definition. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502(8) (1999). 
The Delaware Department of Insurance has issued regulations to pre-
vent discrimination against potential insureds by life and health insur-
ers when phrasing questions or requiring tests relating to AIDS. DEL. 
REGS. § 56-1 to 56-5 (1999). 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
The District of Columbia Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment, public accommodations, housing, 
education, real estate transactions, and the sale of motor vehicle insur-
ance on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal 
definition of disability. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(5A) (1992 & Supp. 
1997). 
Policy Statement, D.C. Office of Human Rights, 8A Lab. ReI. Rep. 
(BNA) 453:1715 (Oct. 9, 1986). 
FLORIDA 
The Florida Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ny person with or per-
ceived as having acquired immune deficiency syndrome, acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human 
immunodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available to 
handicapped persons." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997). 
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The Florida Civil Rights Act, prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-
760.11,509.092 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
The Florida Fair Housing Act prohibits housing discrimination on the 
basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.20-760.37 (West 1997 & 
Supp. 1998). 
The Florida Educational Equity Act, prohibits discrimination against 
students and employees on the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 228.2001 (2) (West 1998). 
However, public accommodation, housing accommodations, and pub-
lic employment nondiscrimination rights are granted to the "physi-
cally disabled," which is defined as "any person having a physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08(6) (a) (West 1998). 
Persons or entities receiving state financial assistance may not discrim-
inate against an otherwise qualified individual in housing, public ac-
commodations, or government services on the basis that the 
individual is "infected with human immunodeficiency virus." FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 760.50(4)(b) (West 1997). 
Florida prohibits the use of HIV testing as a condition of employment 
and prohibits discrimination against any individual on the basis of 
"knowledge or belief that the individual has taken an [HIV] test or the 
results or perceived results of such test." FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 760.50(3)(b) (West 1997 and Supp. 1998). 
Florida courts are prohibited from denying shared parental responsi-
bility, custody, or visitation rights to a parent or grandparent solely 
because the parent or grandparent "is or is believed to be infected 
with human immunodeficiency virus." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(6) 
(West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
GEORGIA 
The Georgia Equal Employment for Persons with Disabilities Code 
prohibits discrimination in public and private employment on the ba-
sis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. GA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-6A-2 (1998). Nondiscrimination provisions do not ap-
ply to an applicant for employment who has "any communicable dis-
ease, either carried by or afflicting an applicant." Id. § 34-6A-3(b) (2). 
Georgia does not have a nondiscrimination statute covering public ac-
commodations, housing, or other areas. 
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GUAM 
The Guam Employment Relations Act prohibits discrimination in 
public and private employment on the basis of "disability." Disability 
incorporates the federal definition and includes "physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result 
of the attitudes of others as having such an impairment." 22 GUAM 
CODE ANN. § 5202(b) (4) (1998). 
HAWAII 
The Hawaii Confidentiality of HIV Information Act prohibits the com-
pelled release of HIV test results or disclosure of HIV testing "in order 
to obtain or maintain housing, employment, or education." HAw. 
REv. STAT. § 325-101 (c) (1996 & Supp. 1999). 
The Hawaii housing nondiscrimination provisions prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of "HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infec-
tion" and bar inquiries as to whether an individual has been tested for 
HIV. HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-3 (1993 & Supp. 1999). The statute also 
incorporates the federal definition of disability. Id. § 515-2. 
The Hawaii Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment, 
housing, access to state services and public accommodations on the 
basis of "disability." The definition of disability incorporates the fed-
eral definition. HAw. REv. STAT. § 368-1.5(b) (1999). 
IDAHO 
The Idaho Commission on Human Rights Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment and real estate transactions 
and financing on the basis of "disability." The statutory definition of 
"disability" incorporates the federal definition although "substantial 
limitation" is not specified as being imposed on a major life activity. 
IDAHO CODE § 67-5902(15) (1995). Associational discrimination is 
prohibited in real property transactions. Id. § 67-5909 (1995). 
ILLINOIS 
The Illinois Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment, housing, credit and financing, and public ac-
commodations on the basis of "handicap," which is defined as a "de-
terminable physical or mental characteristic of a person ... the history 
of such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the 
person complained against, which may result from disease .... " 775 
ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). See also 
Illinois Interpretative Rules on Handicap Discrimination in Employ-
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ment, Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, § 2500. For purposes of employment, 
the characteristic must be unrelated to the person's ability to perform 
the duties of a particular job or position; for purposes of housing, the 
characteristic must be unrelated to the person's ability to acquire, rent 
or maintain a housing accommodation; for purposes of credit unre-
lated to a person's ability to repay and public accommodations, must 
be unrelated to the person's ability to utilize and benefit from a place 
of public accommodation. 
In Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 
N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. 1996), affg655 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995), 
the Illinois Supreme Court held that HIV infection, because it is "a 
determinable physical characteristic resulting from a disease," is a 
handicap with the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act. 
INDIANA 
The Indiana Civil Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment, housing, public accommodations, and education 
based on "disability." "Disability" is defined as "the physical or mental 
condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability." IND. 
CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(r) (West 1997). 
The Indiana Equal Access to Housing for Persons with Disabilities Law 
defines "individual with a disability" as "an individual who, by reason 
of physical or mental defect or infirmity, whether congenital or ac-
quired by accident, injury, or disease, is or may subsequently be totally 
or partially prevented from achieving the fullest attainable, physical, 
social, economic, mental and vocational participation in the normal 
process ofliving." IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-6 (West 1997). 
IOWA 
The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and pri-
vate employment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis 
of disability, which is defined to include "the condition of a person 
with a positive human immunodeficiency virus test result, a diagnosis 
of [AIDS], a diagnosis of [ARC], or any other condition related to 
[AIDS]." IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). The 
inclusion positive HIV test results within the definition of disability is 
explicitly noted "not to preclude" the inclusion of other "conditions 
resulting from other contagious or infectious diseases" from that defi-
nition. Id. 
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KANSAS 
The Kansas Act Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination in 
public and private employment, public accommodations and services, 
and housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the 
federal definition. RAN. STAT. ANN § 44-1002 (1993). 
The Kansas HIV reporting statute provides that "[i]nformation re-
garding ... HIV infection reported [for epidemiological purposes by 
physicians and laboratory directors to the state secretary of health] 
shall 'not be used in any form or manner which would lead to the 
discrimination against any individual or group with regard to employ-
ment, to provision of medical care or acceptance into facilities or insti-
tutions for medical care, housing, education, transportation, or for 
the provision of any other goods or services." RAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6004(d) (Supp. 1998). 
KENTUCKY 
The Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act provides that "any person with 
[AIDS], [ARC], or human immunodeficiency virus shall have every 
protection made available to individuals with disabilities under [the 
employment nondiscrimination provisions of Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes §§] 207.130 to 207.240 and Section 504 [of] the Rehabilitation 
Act. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). HIV 
testing is prohibited in pre-employment examinations and for current 
employees, unless HIV status is a bona fide occupational qualification. 
[d. § 207.135(2) (a) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). An employer asserting 
HIV as a bona fide occupational qualification must prove that the test 
is "necessary to ascertain whether an employee is currently able to per-
form in a reasonable manner the duties of the particular job or 
whether the employee will present a significant risk of transmitting 
human immunodeficiency virus infection to other persons in the 
course of normal work activities." Additionally, the employer bears 
the burden of proving that there exists "no means of reasonable ac-
commodation short of requiring the test." [d. § 207.135(2) (b). Em-
ployers may make pre-employment inquiries concerning the existence 
of an applicant's disability and about the extent to which that disabil-
ity has been overcome by treatment or medication. Id. § 207.140(1). 
Nondiscrimination protections do not apply in the case of applicants 
for employment or housing who have "any communicable disease." 
Discrimination based on HIV infection, or perception of infection, is 
prohibited in housing, public accommodations, and governmental 
services. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(3) (a)-(b) (Banks-Baldwin 
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1997). Entities receiving state financial assistance are also prohibited 
from discriminating on the basis of HIV infection or the perception of 
HIV infection. Id. 
Licensed health care professionals who treat patients with HIV are 
also protected from discrimination. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 207.135(3) (d) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
LOUISIANA 
The Louisiana Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons prohibits dis-
crimination in employment, education, housing, and public services 
on the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" incorporates the federal defi-
nition of disability. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-2253(1) (West 1999). 
MAINE 
Maine law (Ch. 501, Medical Conditions), provides that employees or 
applicants for employment may not be required to submit to HIV test-
ing or to reveal whether they have been tested for HIV, except when 
based on a bona fide occupational qualification. This provision is en-
forced by the Maine Human Rights Commission. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 5, § 19204-B (West Supp. 1999). 
The Maine Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and 
private employment, housing, public accommodations, financing, and 
education on the basis of "physical or mental disability." "Disability" is 
defined as "physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a 
substantial disability as determined by a physician ... " ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West Supp. 1999) (definition 7-A). 
As noted in Abbott v. Bragdon, lO7 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), the concept 
of disability under the Maine Human Rights Act is co-extensive with 
that of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
MARYLAND 
Maryland's HIV informed consent testing statute provides that refusal 
to undergo HIV testing may not be used "as the sole basis by any insti-
tution or laboratory to deny services or treatment." MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 18-336(c) (Supp. 1999). 
Maryland's statute providing for disclosure of HIV information to fire 
fighters, emergency medical technicians, rescue squadpersons, law en-
forcement officers, and correctional officers provides that individuals 
in those occupations "may not refuse to treat or transport an individ-
ual because the individual is HIV positive." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 18-213(m) (Supp. 1999). Similarly, with regard to the transpor-
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tation of HIV positive decedents, the same standard applies to correc-
tional officers, first responders, law enforcement officers, medical care 
facilities, and physicians performing postmortem exams. [d. § 18-
213.2(h) (Supp. 1999). 
The Maryland Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, housing, public accommodations, retail serv-
ices, and by persons licensed or regulated by the State Department of 
Licensing and Regulations on the basis of physical or mental handi-
cap, or perceived handicap, which is defined as "any physical disability 
... which is caused by ... illness .... " MD. ANN. CODE, art. 49B, 
§ 15(g) (1998 & Supp. 1999). 
The Maryland Commission on Human Relations has interpreted the 
statutory definition as including "infection with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus." MD. REGs. CODE tit. 14, § 14.03.02.02 (1999). In 
its interpretation of the Act, the Commission incorporated the federal 
definition of disability, including the "perceived-as" disabled element. 
[d. § 14.03.02.03. 
Discrimination against public school teachers on basis of "handicap" 
is prohibited. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-104 (1999). "Handicap" is 
not defined. 
Discrimination insurance not allowed for disability unless actuarially 
justified. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-208 (1997 & Supp. 1999). 
MASSACHUSEITS 
The Massachusetts Unlawful Discrimination Law prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment and real estate transactions on 
the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" incorporates the federal defini-
tion of disability. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 (West 1998 & 
Supp. 2000). 
MICHIGAN 
The Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment, public accommodations, public 
services, housing and real estate, and educational facilities for handi-
capped individuals. "Handicap" incorporates the federal definition, 
but instead of impairment, the statute uses the term "determinable 
physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result 
from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disor-
der." MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 37.1103(d) (West Supp. 1999). 
In Robinson V. Henry Ford Health Systems, 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994), afJ'd without opinion, 86 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir. 1996), the 
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court noted that persons "who have tested positive for AIDS or the 
AIDS-related HIV virus are covered as handicapped or disabled indi-
viduals under both the Michigan and federal [Rehabilitation] acts." 
MINNESOTA 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, public 
services, and education on the basis of "disability." MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 363.01 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000). The statutory definition of "disa-
bility" incorporates the federal definition, although impairment may 
be "physical, sensory, or mental" and the limitation on one or more 
major life activities must be "material." [d. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted this provision to apply to 
asymptomatic HIV infection in Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), on the basis that individuals with HIV are ma-
terially limited in several major life activities, including social partici-
pation (because of emotional problems as well as ostracism), sexual 
activities, child-bearing, access to insurance coverage, and limitations 
on career choices involving extensive training resulting from limited 
life expectancy, and limitations on ability to work due to need for 
medical care. 
MISSISSIPPI 
Mississippi's employment law prohibits discrimination in public em-
ployment and by employers receiving state funding on the basis of 
"handicap." There is no statutory definition of "handicap." MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (1999). 
Mississippi does not have a nondiscrimination law covering private 
employment or other areas. 
MISSOURI 
The Missouri HIV and Public Health Act provides that the Missouri 
Human Rights Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.0lO-213.137 (West 1996 & 
Supp. 1998), "shall apply to individuals with HIV infection .... " [d. 
§ 191.665 (West 1996). 
The Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits discrimination in 
employment, public accommodations, housing, and commercial real 
estate loans on the basis of "disability." The statutory definition of 
"disability" incorporates the federal definition. Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 213.0lO(10) (West Supp. 2000). The MHRA also includes "associa-
tional" discrimination. [d. § 213.070(4) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). 
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MONTANA 
The Montana Hospitals and Related Facilities Law provides that "a 
health care facility may not refuse to admit a person to the facility 
solely because the person has an HIV-related condition." "HIV-re-
lated condition" means "any medical condition resulting from an HIV 
infection, including but not limited to seropositivity for HIV." MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-5-105(2) (2000). 
The Montana Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, public accommodations, education, and 
housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the fed-
eral definition. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19) (1997). 
NEBRASKA 
The Nebraska Individual Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, housing, education, and public accommoda-
tions on the basis that the individual discriminated against "is suffer-
ing or is suspected of suffering from human immunodeficiency virus 
infection or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome." NEB. REv. STAT. 
§ 20-168 (1997). Each agency of the state government was required to 
"examine policies and practices within its jurisdiction that may inten-
tionally or unintentionally result in discrimination against a person 
who has taken a [HIV] antibody or antigen test or who has been diag-
nosed as having [AIDS] or [ARC] to ascertain the extent and types of 
discrimination that may exist," and to report its findings to the state 
legislature by December 1, 1988. [d. § 20-167. 
The Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment on the basis of "disability." "Disabil-
ity" incorporates the federal definition. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1102(9) 
(1993). 
NEVADA 
The Nevada Equal Opportunity for Employment Law prohibits dis-
crimination in public and private employment on the basis of "disabil-
ity." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. NEV. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 613.310(1) (Michie 1996). 
The Nevada Fair Housing Law prohibits discrimination in housing on 
the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal defini-
tion. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.045 (Michie 1998). 
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NEW HAMPSHIRE 
The New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment, housing, and public accom-
modations on the basis of "physical or mental disability." "Disability" 
incorporates the federal definition. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:2.IV (1995). 
Landlords are prohibited from evicting a tenant "solely on the 
grounds that the person has [AIDS] or is regarded to have [AIP~]." 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1O.VI (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
NEW JERSEY 
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment, public accommodations and facili-
ties (including public and private schools), public and private hous-
ing, real estate transactions on the basis of "handicap," which includes 
"AIDS or HIV infection." NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1 and 10:5-5(q) 
(West 1993 & Supp. 1999). "HIV infection" is defined as "infection 
with the human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus 
identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS." Id. § 1O:5-5(gg). 
Announcement, NJ. Div. Civ. Rights, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) ,-
5026 Guly 1986) (AIDS discrimination and testing for AIDS prohib-
ited). Associational discrimination is prohibited in housing. NJ. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 1993). 
In Poffv. Caro, 549 A.2d 900,903 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987), the 
court ruled that New Jersey law prohibits housing discrimination 
based on the perception that an individual has AIDS or the "poten-
tial" to develop AIDS, noting that there is no rational basis for distin-
guishing between those with a disability and those so perceived. 
NEW MEXICO 
New Mexico's Human Immunodeficiency Virus Related Test Limita-
tion Law prohibits employers from requiring disclosure of HIV-related 
test results for purposes of hiring, promotion, or continued employ-
ment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-10A-1 (Michie 1996). 
New Mexico's Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, housing, and public accommodations on the 
basis of "physical or mental handicap" or "serious medical condition." 
"Handicap" incorporates the federal definition of disability. N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2.M, 28-1-7.A (Michie 1996). 
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NEW YORK 
The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, and fi-
nancing based on "disability." "Disability" is defined as a "physical, 
mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiologi-
cal, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of 
a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted 
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques," or a record such an im-
pairment, or a condition regarded by others as such an impairment. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998). This provi-
sion has been interpreted by the New York Division on Human Rights 
to include HIV infection. Policy Statement, N.Y. Div. Human Rights, 
8A Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) 455:3081 (Dec. 1985). 
Petri v. Bank of N. Y. Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
1992) (asymptomatic HIV infection, whether actual or perceived, is 
disability under New York law). 
Seitzman v. Hudson River Assocs., 542 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1989) (successful discrimination claim under New York law of 
physician-tenant whose practice included patients with AIDS). 
NORTH CAROLINA 
The North Carolina Communicable Disease Act (NCCDA) prohibits 
discrimination in continued employment, housing, public services, 
public accommodations, and public transportation against "any per-
son having AIDS virus or HIV infection on account of that infec-
tion[.]" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1999). The NCCDA also 
prohibits the use or requirement of HIV testing to determine suitabil-
ity for continued employment, housing, public services, public accom-
modations, and public transportation. Id. However, the NCCDA 
allows licensed health care providers and facilities to discriminate 
against patients with HIV infection "to protect the health care pro-
vider or employees of the provider or employees of the facility while 
providing appropriate care" and to refer the patient with HIV to an-
other provider or facility "when such referral is for the purpose of 
providing more appropriate treatment." Id. § 130A-148U) (1999). 
The North Carolina Persons With Disabilities Act (NCPDA) prohibits 
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, public serv-
ices, and public transportation on the basis of handicap. The NCPDA 
incorporates the federal definition of disability, N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 168A-3(7a) & (7b) (1999). However, the NCPDA allows HIV testing 
of job applicants, denial of employment to job applicants based on 
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HIV status, and HIV testing as an annual medical examination rou-
tinely required of all employees by the employer. Reassignment or ter-
mination of employment is allowed if the employee poses a significant 
risk to the employee or others, or if the employee is unable to p.er-
form the normally assigned duties of the job. Does not include "work-
ing" among the activities identified as major life activities. Id. § 168A-
5(b). 
In Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990), the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted the North Carolina stat-
ute (then titled the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection 
Act) as not applying to HIV infection because (1) the statute ex-
empted "communicable diseases" from the definition of handicap and 
(2) HIV did not limit a major life activity as defined by the act. At the 
time of the Burgess decision, the North Carolina statute did not in-
clude working as a "major life activity." 
The North Carolina Handicapped Persons Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public accommodations and conveyances, and housing, on the 
basis of "handicap." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A (1999). The Act has been 
construed to be limited to a present, non-correctable loss of function 
that substantially limits a person's ability to function normally. See 
Pressman v. University of North Carolina, 337 S.E.2d 644, 649 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1985). 
NORTH DAKOTA 
The North Dakota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in pub-
lic and private employment, housing, property rights, public services, 
credit transactions, and public accommodations on the basis of "disa-
bility." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-02.4-02 (1997). 
OHIO 
The Ohio AIDS and HIV Programs Law provides that disclosure of 
HIV test results to health care providers "may not be requested or 
made solely for the purpose of identifying an individual who has a 
positive HIV test result ... in order to refuse to treat the individual." 
OHIO REv. CODE Ann. § 3701.24.3(B) (2) (Anderson 1999). The Ohio 
AIDS and HIV Programs Law also provides that "no [governmental 
agency] or private nonprofit corporation receiving state or local gov-
ernment funds shall refuse to admit as a patient, or to provide services 
to, any individual solely because he refuses to consent to an HIV test 
or to disclose HIV test results." Id. § 3701.24.5(A). 
HeinOnline -- 3 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 323 1999-2000
2000] "DISABILny" UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAw 323 
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission Act prohibits discrimination in 
public and private employment, housing, public accommodations, 
and granting of credit on the basis of "handicap." The statute incorpo-
rates the federal definition of disability (setting forth as major life ac-
tivities the "functions of caring for one's self, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working."). OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (13) (Anderson 1999). 
"Physical or mental impairment" includes "human immunodeficiency 
viIlls infection." Id. § 4112.01 (16)(a)(iii). 
, ~ f .. 
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission has interpreted this law as cover-
ing HIV infection. Policy Statement, Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n, 8A 
Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) 457:275 (Mar. 25, 1987); see also Lawson v. E.R 
Towers Co., No. B3112385(13570)-052086 (Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n, 
Nov. 14, 1986), summarized in 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) 421:678. 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission regulations include "perceived as" 
handicapped within the definition. Ohio Admin. Code § 4112-5-
02(H) (1997). See also Cleveland v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 648 
N.E.2d 516 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
OKLAHOMA 
The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in 
public and private employment, public accommodations, and housing 
on the basis of handicap. Handicap incorporates the federal defini-
tion of disability. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1301 (4) (West 1999). 
OREGON 
The Oregon Civil Rights of Disabled Persons Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment, housing, and public accom-
modations on the basis of "disability." "Disability" generally 
incorporates the federal definition, but defines "major life activity" as 
including but not limited to "self-care, ambulation, communication, 
transportation, education, socialization, employment and the ability 
to acquire, rent or maintain property." OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 659.400 (2) (a) (1996). "Substantially limits" means that the "impair-
ment renders the person unable to perform a major life activity that 
the average person in the general population can perform ... or ... 
significantly restricts the condition, manner or duration under which 
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared 
to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person 
in the general population can perform the same major life activity." 
Id. § 659.400(2) (d). 
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PENNSYLVANIA 
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act covers handicap discrimina-
tion, including discrimination on basis of perceived handicap, in em-
ployment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of 
"handicap or disability." PA. STAT . .ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954-955 (1999). 
"Handicap or disability" incorporates the federal definition of disabil-
ity. Id. § 954(p.l). 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission regulations provide that a 
handicap or disability which is not job-related but which may worsen 
and become job related is covered, subject to the defense of undue 
hardship. PA. CODE tit. 16, § 44.15 (1998). 
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has interpreted the 
Act to cover AIDS/ ARC/HIV. Policy Statement, Pa. Hum. Relations 
Comm'n, Apr. 10, 1986. 
PUERTO RICO 
Puerto Rico has enacted a law for the prohibition of all discrimination 
against persons diagnosed with HIV or AIDS. P.R LAws .ANN. tit. 1 
§ 521 (1998). The Puerto Rico Discrimination Against Disabled Per-
sons Act prohibits discrimination in public and private employment, 
access to the physical facilities of public and private entities, public 
and private education, and by Commonwealth-funded private or pub-
lic institutions on the basis of physical or mental disabilities. Id. 
§§ 502-508 (Supp. 1997). Disability is defined as "a temporary or per-
manent condition of a motor or mental nature which hinders or limits 
[an individual's] inception or ability to work, study or enjoy life fully." 
Id. § 501(d). 
RHODE ISlAND 
The Rhode Island Prevention and Suppression of Contagious Disease 
Act prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, granting of 
credit, public accommodation, or delivery of services on the basis of "a 
positive AIDS test result, or perception of same .... " R.I. GEN. LAws 
§§ 23-6-22 (1996). The Act also prohibits the requirement of an "AIDS 
test" as a condition of employment, "except where nondiscrimination 
can be shown, on the testimony of competent medical authorities, to 
constitute a clear and present danger of AIDS virus transmission to 
others." Id. 
The Rhode Island Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act prohibits 
discrimination employment, housing, and public accommodations on 
the basis of "disability." R.1. GEN. LAws § 42-87-1 (b)-(c) (Supp; 1999). 
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The Act incorporates the federal definition of disability and cross-ref-
erences the federal Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities 
Act for its definition of prohibited, discriminatory acts or conduct. 
The Rhode Island Equal Opportunity and Mfirmative Action Act pro-
hibits discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of 
"disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition and pro-
vides that the definition "shall include any disability which is provided 
protection under the [ADA] and federal regulations pertaining to the 
[ADA~;" citing 28 C.F.R pt. 35 and 29 C.F.R pt. 1630. RI. GEN. LAws 
§ 28-5-6(9) (Supp. 1999). 
The Rhode Island Equal Opportunity and Mfirmative Action Act pro-
hibits discrimination in public employment, services, facilities, and ed-
ucational programs on the basis of "disability." RI. GEN. LAws § 28-
5.1-1 (1995 & Supp. 1999). "Disability" is not defined. 
The Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act prohibits discrimination 
in housing on the basis of disability. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-37-3(5), (9) 
(Supp. 1997). 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
The South Carolina Human Affairs Law prohibits discrimination in 
public and private employment on the basis of "disability." "Disability" 
incorporates the federal definition and provides that the term "must 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the [ADA]." S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-30 
(West Supp. 1999). 
The South Carolina Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons prohibits 
discrimination in public accommodations, public services, and hous-
ing on the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" is defined as "a substantial 
physical or mental impairment ... acquired by ... disease, where the 
impairment is verified by medical findings and appears reasonably 
certain to continue throughout the lifetime of the individual without 
substantial improvement." Id. § 43-33-560 (West Supp. 1999). The 
definition also excludes individuals who are only regarded as handi-
capped. The definition of "handicapped person" for purposes of 
South Carolina law incorporates the federal definition and "any other 
definition prescribed by federal law or regulation for use by agencies 
of state government which serve handicapped persons." Id. § 2-7-35 
(1986). 
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SOUTH DAKOTA 
The South Dakota Human Rights Act Law prohibits discrimination in 
public and private employment, housing, public accommodations, 
and education on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the 
federal definition. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-13-1 (Michie 1995). 
TENNESSEE 
The Tennessee Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, public accommodations, and housiI!g.on the 
basis of "handicap." "Handicap" incorporates the federal definition of 
disability. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(9) (A) (1998). 
TEXAS 
The Texas Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Act pro-
hibits HIV testing for employment purposes, unless the employer can 
show that HIV status is a bona fide occupational qualification and 
there is not a less discriminatory means of satisfying the occupational 
qualification. TEX. CODE HEALTH & SAFETI' ANN. § 81.102(a)(4)(A) 
(West 1992). This provision applies to home collection kits for HIV 
testing. Id. § 85.253(c) (West Supp. 2000). 
The Texas HIV Service Act provides that the results of HIV testing 
conducted by a health department voluntary HIV testing program 
"may not be used for insurance purposes, to screen to determine suit-
ability for employment, or to discharge a person from employment." 
TEX. CODE HEALTH & SAFETI' ANN. § 82.082(c) (West 1992). 
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment based on "disability" and incor-
porates the federal definition of disability. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 
§ 21.002(6) (West Supp. 2000). 
The Texas Rights and Responsibilities of Persons with Disabilities Act 
prohibits discrimination in housing accommodations and public facil-
ities based on "disability." TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.001-
121.011 (West Supp. 2000). "Disability" is defined as a "mental or 
physical disability, including mental retardation, hearing impairment, 
deafness, speech impairment, visual impairment, or any health im-
pairment that requires special ambulatory devices or services." Id. 
§ 121.002(4). 
UTAH 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment on the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" in-
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corporates the federal definition of disability. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 34A-5-102 (1997). 
The Utah Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing on the 
basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-2(9)(a) (1997). 
VERMONT 
The Vermont Fair Employment Practice Act prohibits discrimination 
In public and private employment on the basis of "a person's having a 
positive test result from an HIV-related blood test." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 495(a) (6) (1999). 
The Vermont Discrimination Law prohibits discrimination in public 
accommodations and housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" 
incorporates the federal definition. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 
(1997). 
VIRGIN ISLANDS, U.S. 
The Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act does not include HIV or other "disa-
bility nondiscrimination provisions. V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1-10,61-
75 (1982 & Supp. 1998). 
VIRGINIA 
The Virginia Disease Prevention and Control Act provides that "[n]o 
person known or suspected to be positive for infection with . . . 
human immunodeficiency virus shall be refused services for that rea-
son by any public safety agency personnel." Public safety agencies in-
clude the sheriff's office, adult or youth correctional, law 
enforcement, and fire safety organizations, or any governmental 
agency or department that employs persons who have law enforce-
ment authority. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.2 (Michie 1997). 
The Virginians with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination in public 
and private employment, education, public accommodations, and 
housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the fed-
eral definition. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3 (Michie 1997). 
The Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA) prohibits conduct "which vi-
olates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing discrimi-
nation on the basis of ... disability." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-716 (Michie 
Supp. 1999). Nothing in the VHRA "shall be deemed to ... expand 
upon any of the provisions of any other state or federal law relating to 
discrimination because of ... disability." Id. § 2.1-717. 
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WASHINGTON 
The Washington Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment on the basis of "HIV infection" (ac-
tual or perceived), including requiring HIV testing as a condition of 
employment, unless absence of HIV infection is bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.172 (West 1990 & 
Supp. 1997). Absence of HIV infection as a bona fide occupational 
qualification exists "when performance of a particular job can be 
shown to present a significant risk, as defined by the board of health 
by rule, of transmitting HIV infection to other persons, and there ex-
ists no means of eliminating the risk by restructuring the job." Id. 
§ 49.60.172(3). Claims of actual or perceived HIV discrimination are 
to be "evaluated in the same manner" as other claims of disability dis-
crimination. Id. § 49.60.174(1). 
The Washington Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment, public accommodations, housing 
and real estate transactions, and financing and credit transactions on 
the basis of "sensory, mental or physical disability." WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN. § 49.60.010 (West Supp. 1997). No definition of disability is 
provided. 
WEST VIRGINIA 
The West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment, public accommodations, and housing on the ba-
sis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition of 
disability. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(m) (1999). 
In Benjamin R v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 818 (W. Va. 
1990), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that HIV 
infection is a handicap under the WVHRA on the basis that HIV infec-
tion substantially impairs or limits the major life activity of "socializa-
tion" because of the psychological impact resulting from knowledge of 
one's HIV status; the WVHRA was subsequently amended to conform 
more precisely to federal law. 
WISCONSIN 
The Wisconsin Communicable Disease Control Law prohibits health 
care providers, peace officers, fire fighters, correctional officers, state 
patrol officers, jailers, home health agencies, and inpatient health 
care facilities from discriminating against an individual who has "a 
positive test for the presence of HIV, antigen or nonantigenic prod-
ucts of HIV or an antibody to HIV, solely because the individual has 
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HIV infection or an illness or medical condition that is caused by. 
arises from or is related to HIV infection." WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 252.14(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act prohibits discrimination in pub-
lic and private employment on the basis of "disability." "Disability" 
incorporates the federal definition of disability. WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 111.31-32 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999). 
WYOMING 
The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act prohibits discrimination 
in public and private employment on the basis of "handicap." The 
statute provides no definition for handicap. WYo. STAT. § 27-9-105 
. (1999). The Wyoming Fair Employment Commission Rules of Prac-
tice incorporate the federal definition of disability. 
